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Abstract
The present study examined the relationships of 
politics in appraisal and political use of appraisal to 
ratee attitudes and desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback. Hypotheses were developed from research on 
politics in appraisal, the feedback process model of 
Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor, 1979, and equity theory 
(Adams, 1965). Negative relationships between politics 
and dependent variables were predicted. Two studies 
were conducted. Study 1 used 97 professionals in two 
organizations to test the effects of hypothetical 
political use of appraisal on their attitudes and 
desire to respond to appraisal feedback. Study 2 used 
145 professionals in two organizations to investigate 
the relationship of politics in performance appraisal 
to ratee atitudes and desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback. Results of both studies generally supported 
the hypothesized negative relationship between 
political distortion of ratings and ratee attitudes and 
desire to respond to feedback. A tentative model of 
the effects of politics in performance appraisal was 
presented and implications for researchers and
viii
practitioners were presented and directions for future 
research were discussed.
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The Effects of Politically Biased Performance 
Appraisal on Ratee Job Attitudes and Desire to Respond
to Feedback
The appraisal of employee performance has been a 
research concern of applied psychologists for over 70 
years (Landy & Farr, 1983). Performance evaluation 
remains a vital topic in the organizational sciences 
literature. For example, several applied psychology 
journals (e.g., Personnel Psychology. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes) devote significant portions of 
each issue to articles on its study and practice.
Performance appraisal is also of concern to 
businesses and organizations and plays a major role in 
personnel and organizational decisions (Landy & Farr, 
1983). Its importance is highlighted by the number of 
organizations that practice it. Locher and Teel 
(1988) estimate that over 92 percent of all U.S. 
organizations use some form of formal employee 
performance evaluation.
Performance appraisal is used by organizations for 
many purposes. Performance ratings are used for 
validating employee selection procedures, making
1
compensation and promotion decisions, establishing 
training program objectives, monitoring employee 
performance, and providing feedback to employees 
(Cleveland, Murphy, & Williams, 1989; Landy & Farr, 
1983). It is seen by practitioners as a significant 
means of improving performance and productivity of 
both individuals and organizations 
(Longenecker, 1989).
Performance appraisal continues to be an integral 
part of the work of human resource practitioners. 
Given its widespread use and importance to 
organizational functioning, it is not surprising that 
it is a major topic of study in personnel and 
organizational psychology. The present research 
attempts to add to this body of research knowledge by 
assessing the effects of political bias in rating.
The present study will use both survey and simulation 
techniques in a field setting to investigate the 
relationship between politically biased use of 
performance appraisal and ratee job attitudes and 
desire to respond to feedback.
Past Research in Performance Appraisal;
Increasing Accuracy
There are numerous means of assessing employee 
performance including production and personnel 
records, self-ratings, and peer ratings. Despite the 
numerous methods of evaluation available to 
practitioners, the most widely used means of 
performance appraisal is supervisory judgment of 
performance (Landy & Farr, 1983). These methods call 
for supervisors to provide ratings of subordinate 
performance. Ratings are made relative to other 
employees and/or to some pre-determined standard 
of performance.
Research on judgmental appraisal methods has 
focused on reducing unintentional errors. These 
biases include halo error, leniency/severity bias, and 
central tendency bias. A variety of approaches to 
reducing these errors has been examined. For example, 
various rating instruments (e.g., trait scales, 
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales, Behavioral 
Observation Scales, Mixed Standard Scales) have been 
developed and studied (for a review see Landy & Farr, 
1983). More recently, researchers have focused on the
cognitive processes involved in making ratings of 
performance (e.g., Feldman, 1981).
Additionally, rater training programs (e.g., rater 
error training, rater accuracy training, frame of 
reference training) have been developed and researched 
(for a review see Smith, 1981). The major purpose of 
these instruments and programs has been to increase 
accuracy in rating.
Most of the past research assumes that raters are 
motivated to provide accurate ratings of employee 
performance. If they are incapable of providing 
accurate ratings, it is thought to be due to a lack of 
training or due to problems with the rating 
instruments. This research further assumes that true 
performance evaluations for ratees exist (i.e., "true 
scores"). There are numerous definitions of and 
issues concerning accuracy and "true score" (Sulsky & 
Balzer, 1988). However, nearly all definitions of 
accuracy assume that true scores do exist and that 
inaccuracy is due to the combined effects of random 
error and systematic error (i.e., bias).
Past research has assumed that raters attempt to 
give ratings which are as accurate as possible. Any
inaccuracy has been assumed to be due to unintentional 
bias. Banks and Murphy (1985) contend that the 
question of the raters' willingness to convey accurate 
appraisals has been largely ignored by researchers. 
Banks and Murphy suggest that the assumption that 
raters are motivated to provide accurate ratings of 
subordinate performance in organizations may 
be unrealistic.
Recent Research in Performance Appraisal:
Rater Motivation
The issue of the rater's motivation in rating 
behavior has been recently addressed by a number of 
authors (Banks & Murphy, 1985; Longenecker, 1989; 
Bernardin & Villanova, 1986). These authors posit 
that raters in organizations are rarely motivated to 
provide accurate appraisals. Further, in some cases, 
raters may be strongly motivated to provide 
inaccurate ratings (Longenecker et al., 1987).
These various motivations may not be present in 
typical laboratory performance appraisal research, 
where raters and ratees usually have no vested 
interest in the ratings given or received. Further, 
raters and ratees are unlikely to have any subsequent
contact with each other following the experiment 
(Ilgen & Favero, 1985).
In contrast to the laboratory, performance 
appraisal in organizations has a number of significant 
implications for both the rater and the ratee. For 
example, raters in organizations usually have 
subsequent interactions with ratees, and their ratings 
are often subject to review by their superiors (Ilgen 
& Favero, 1985). It is apparent, therefore, that 
performance appraisal in organizations has significant 
consequences for raters and ratees.
One significant consequence of performance 
appraisal in organizations is its effect on ratee 
compensation and/or promotion (Mohrman, Resnick-West,
& Lawler, 1989). Additionally, performance appraisal 
is used to assist in employee counseling and 
development. However, in achieving these ends, 
performance appraisal creates a written document which 
can follow the ratee throughout his or her career with 
the organization (Longenecker et al., 1988).
Recent research suggests that raters take the 
consequences of their ratings into account when 
completing performance evaluations. For example,
results from a study by Longenecker et al. (1987) 
suggested that raters are more lenient when their 
ratings will be used to determine compensation.
Zedeck and Cascio (1982) found that the ratings given 
identical performance differed, depending on the 
purpose for the rating (research vs. administrative). 
Ratings to be used for administrative purposes tended 
to be more lenient than ratings made for research 
purposes. Research by Williams, DeNisi, Blencoe, and 
Cafferty (1985) suggests that appraisal for feedback 
and development purposes is less prone to leniency 
than appraisal for administrative purposes. It is 
apparent from this body of research that rating 
purpose has an effect on performance ratings.
Cleveland et al. (1989), in summarizing research 
on the multiple purposes of performance appraisals, 
concluded that raters consider the ultimate impact of 
the ratings given when completing performance 
appraisals. Further, interviews of managers by 
Longenecker et al. (1987) suggested that raters 
consider the multiple purposes for ratings prior to 
completing appraisal forms. According to Longenecker 
et al., raters determine the consequences of each
purpose and complete written appraisals with the most 
important consequences in mind. All other purposes 
are thus de-emphasized.
Politically Motivated Rating Behavior
Recent research (e.g., Cleveland et al., 1989; 
Longenecker et al., 1987; Banks & Murphy, 1985) has 
indicated that raters in organizations take the 
consequences of their ratings into account when 
completing performance appraisals. It is possible 
that raters intentionally distort ratings to affect 
the appraisal consequences for themselves and/or 
their subordinates (Longenecker et al., 1987).
Research by Longenecker et al. suggests that raters in 
organizations may have numerous motivations for 
distorting ratings. Raters may distort ratings to 
avoid conflict with employees, to motivate 
subordinates, and to affect compensation/promotion 
(Longenecker, 1991).
In in-depth interviews of sixty executives, 
Longenecker et al. (1987) found that motivations of 
raters, precipitated by political factors within the 
organization, may be largely responsible for many 
"errors" in rating. According to these authors, past
research assuming accuracy as the rater1s primary goal 
"...ignores one important point. Appraisals take 
place in an organizational environment that is 
anything but completely rational, straightforward, or 
dispassionate. In this environment, accuracy does not 
seem to matter to managers, quite so much as 
discretion, effectiveness, or more importantly, 
survival" (Longenecker et al., p. 184).
Managers noted that political considerations are 
nearly always part of the appraisal process. They 
believed that factors other than the employees' actual 
performance influence the ratings given by appraisers 
(Longenecker et al., 1987). Additionally, managers 
said organizational culture has a great deal of 
influence on the use of politics in appraisal.
Further, managers believed that increased political 
use of appraisals was precipitated by a lack of top 
management support for and use of appraisals. 
Additionally, managers believed that a lack of 
appraisal training, and the view that appraisal is an 
unnecessary bureaucratic exercise, led to politically 
motivated rating distortion (Longenecker, 1989).
Managers noted that political culture tends to 
cascade down through organizations. Political use of 
appraisals at upper levels of the organization was 
thought to lead to political use at subsequent lower 
levels (Longenecker, 1989). Additionally, managers 
indicated that they did not receive adequate 
performance feedback themselves. They felt that this 
was due to the political culture discouraging 
performance feedback (Longenecker, 1988). Managers 
indicated that this lack of feedback led to feelings 
of increased stress and role ambiguity.
Managers1 Rationales for Inflating/Deflating Ratings 
Managers in the study by Longenecker (1989) said 
that there are many reasons for distorting ratings. 
Further, they said that these political reasons 
produce an inflation or deflation of 
subordinate ratings.
Research by Longenecker (1989) and Longenecker et 
al. (1987) suggested that managers may inflate 
subordinate ratings for a number of reasons, including
1) A belief that accurate ratings would reduce
the subordinate's motivation and performance;
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2) A desire to increase employee eligibility for 
merit increases;
3) A wish to avoid the creation of a negative 
permanent record which could harm the 
employee's career;
4) The need to protect good performers whose 
performance deficits are due to 
personal problems;
5) A desire to reward good recent performance;
6) The wish to reward employees showing great
effort despite poor results;
7) A desire to avoid confrontation with 
problem employees;
8) An attempt to get a disliked employee 
promoted out of their department;
9) A strong positive feeling about the employee;
10) A desire to keep performance problems within
the department;
11) A desire to make themselves look good in the 
eyes of their superiors.
Prior research has suggested that ratings may be 
inflated due to one or more of the above-cited
rationales. For example, research by Larson (1986) 
suggested that managers are reluctant to give negative 
feedback. Additionally, Cardy and Dobbins (1982) 
found that liking for the ratee was associated with 
rating leniency. Although managers said that they are 
reluctant to deflate ratings due to legal, ethical and 
motivational consequences, negative distortions do 
happen. Managers in the Longenecker (1989) and 
Longenecker et al. (1987) research cited the following 
rationales for deflating subordinate ratings:
1) To scare better performance out of an 
employee (e.g., a "kick in the pants");
2) To punish a difficult employee;
3) To encourage a problem employee to quit;
4) To create a strong case for a
planned termination;
5) To minimize the amount of merit increase an 
employee receives;
6) To comply with organizational pressures
discouraging high ratings.
Additionally, managers indicated that written 
appraisal (for administrative purposes) can be more
positive or negative than spoken feedback given to 
employees at the time of the appraisal. Managers may 
indeed inflate written ratings but give more accurate 
verbal feedback. Alternatively, managers may deflate 
ratings to comply with organizational pressures 
against giving high ratings which would lead to 
increased compensation. In these cases managers may 
also give more accurate verbal feedback (Longenecker 
et al., 1987).
It is apparent that managers view performance 
appraisal, at least in part, as a discretionary 
management tool used to achieve personal and 
organizational goals (Longenecker & Ludwig, 1990). 
Managers take the consequences of appraisals into 
account prior to making ratings and then may distort 
ratings to bring about desired consequences (Cleveland 
et al., 1989; Longenecker, 1989). Research (e.g., 
Longenecker, 1989; Longenecker et al., 1987) suggests 
that managers believe that they have the ability to 
make fairly accurate ratings. Further, this research 
suggests that bias (systematic error) is, at least in 
part, intentional.
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Recent research has begun to study the possibility 
that raters intentionally distort ratings to achieve 
personal and organizational goals. The organizational 
and political pressures that influence rating behavior 
are now attracting research interest (Longenecker et 
al., 1987).
Consequences of Politically Biased Feedback: A
Research Gap
Whereas recent research suggests that managers may 
distort the ratings and feedback given to employees 
(Longenecker, 1989; Longenecker et al., 1987), the 
consequences of the distortions in terms of employee 
motivation, trust, self-esteem, and development have 
not been investigated.
Previous research (e.g., Bannister, 1986; 
Florin-Thuma & Boudreau, 1987; Guzzo, Jette, &
Katzell, 1985; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979; Ilgen & 
Moore, 1987; Kopelman, 1986; Landy, Farr, & Jacobs, 
1982) has shown an association between performance 
feedback (and feedback characteristics) and subsequent 
employee motivation and job attitudes. When managers 
distort ratings in an attempt to motivate employees 
(and/or achieve other goals), it is possible that the
effects on employees are not the desired ones. 
Politically biased performance feedback could lead to 
reduced motivation and negative job attitudes in 
ratees. Ilgen et al., (1979) present a model of 
performance feedback which demonstrates how feedback 
can affect motivation and performance. This model, 
along with other relevant research, will be presented 
in the following section to show how politically 
biased feedback could affect the feedback-motivation 
and feedback-job attitude relationships.
Performance Feedback and Employee Motivation
Performance feedback can come from various 
sources; however, the most significant source of 
feedback in organizations is primarily an annual or 
semi-annual formal performance review conducted by an 
employee's immediate supervisor (Landy & Farr, 1983). 
The usual result of this appraisal is a document 
indicating how well the employee has performed over 
the past year or half-year. The appraisal is usually 
used in making administrative decisions concerning 
compensation and promotion (Landy & Farr).
In addition to its use for administrative 
functions, performance appraisal/feedback is intended
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to give employees an idea of how well they are 
performing and to help them set goals for future 
performance (Latham & Wexley, 1981). The positive 
relation between goal setting and motivation is well 
established by empirical literature (for a review, see 
Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). Employees use 
feedback concerning their performance to set goals for 
future performance (Locke, 1970).
Previous literature suggests that accurate 
feedback is a necessary condition for goal setting to 
take place (Latham & Yukl, 1975). According to goal 
theory (Locke, 1968; Locke et al., 1981), motivation 
(and thus performance) will increase if feedback leads 
to the setting of specific challenging goals.
Larson (1989) posits that feedback is so essential 
that without it goal setting will have little, if any, 
impact on sustained performance. Additionally, Tziner 
and Latham (1989) found that feedback followed by goal 
setting leads to increased satisfaction and 
organizational commitment.
The probability that feedback will lead to goal 
setting is increased if it is perceived by the ratee 
as accurate (Latham & Wexley, 1981). In the absence
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of feedback, or if the feedback is not accepted, 
motivation will be reduced (Campion & Lord, 1982). 
Research on the link between feedback and performance 
as a process (Ilgen et al., 1979) offers insight into 
the role of feedback in employee motivation 
and performance.
The feedback process model of Ilgen et al. (1979) 
(see Figure 1) posits that feedback, if accepted, will 
lead to motivation to respond, which will lead to goal 
setting, which will then lead to performance. As 
shown in Figure 1, employee acceptance of feedback is 
essential to the feedback— > motivation— > goal 
setting— > performance process. The model 
suggests that a lack of feedback or lack of feedback 
acceptance will lead to reduced ratee motivation, and 
thus, reduced performance.
Ilgen et al., (1979) delineated a number of 
variables which can affect employee acceptance of 
feedback. Research concerning these variables and the 
potential implications of politically motivated
In d iv id u a l d ll ln im ic n  cliniticlntfB lfnB  o t  lo d p l n i i l
P m rn tvp il I ^ 
lnndljm.lt I
|fgS5e }* Ilgen, Fisher and Taylor's (1979) 
feedback process model.
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appraisal on feedback acceptance are presented in the 
following sections.
Acceptance of Feedback
Assuming feedback is given, the feedback source 
and the feedback message are important determinants of 
its acceptance.
Feedback Source. As previously discussed, 
feedback in organizations comes from many sources. 
Feedback can come from supervisors (Heneman, 1986), 
self-assessments (Levine, 1980), subordinates (Mount, 
1984), peers (McEvoy & Buller, 1987), and the work 
itself (e.g., production records; Heneman, 198 6).
Feedback also can come in different forms (e.g., 
written vs. spoken; formal vs. informal). In the 
context of organizational performance appraisal, the 
source is usually an annual or semi-annual performance 
review completed by the employee's immediate 
supervisor. Recent research suggests that feedback 
source characteristics affect employee performance. A 
study by Becker and Klimoski (1989) suggested that 
supervisory feedback was associated with improved job 
performance while feedback from self and peers was 
not. According to Ilgen et al. (1979) the two major
20
components of the source affecting feedback acceptance 
are the source's power and the source's credibility.
Source Power. The power of the source, relative 
to the ratee, influences feedback acceptance. Ilgen 
et al. (1979) suggested that the increased source 
power will lead to increased feedback acceptance. 
Regardless of employees' acceptance of the feedback, 
source power affects employees' desire to respond 
(Carrol & Schneier, 1982). Research by Carrol and 
Schneier suggested that the greater the power of the 
source to reward and/or punish the subordinate, the 
greater the desire to respond. Additionally, research 
by Earley (1986) suggested that the importance of the 
feedback (i.e., its impact on compensation and/or 
promotion) mediates the feedback-performance relation. 
He found that employees are more likely to respond to 
feedback when the feedback source has.the power for 
reward or punishment.
Source Credibility. According to Ilgen et al. 
(1979), source credibility is the principal source 
characteristic affecting acceptance of feedback. 
Credibility is determined by the recipient's 
perception of the source's expertise, the receipient's
trust in the source's motives, and the reliability of 
the source. Earley (1986) demonstrated that employee 
trust in the feedback source mediated the influence 
of feedback on work performance in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom. This research suggests 
that source characteristics influence feedback 
acceptance. Specifically, the greater the source's 
perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and power, the 
greater the ratee's acceptance of feedback. It is 
possible that perceptions of political use of 
performance appraisal could reduce ratee acceptance of 
feedback by reducing trust in the source of the 
rating. The present study will investigate the 
hypothesis that perceived political use of performance 
appraisal will be associated with ratee's reduced 
rating acceptance, trust in the rater (source), and 
the appraisal process (HI).
Feedback Message. The feedback message has two 
major attributes which affect feedback acceptance: 
the sign (positive vs. negative) of the feedback and 
the consistency of the message (Ilgen et al., 1979).
Feedback Sign. In general, positive feedback is 
more readily accepted than negative feedback (Landy &
Farr, 1983). According to Ilgen et al. (1979), 
positive feedback is consistent with most individuals1 
self images and is therefore more readily accepted. 
Recent research has supported the effects of feedback 
sign. For example, Russell and Goode (1988) found 
that managers' satisfaction with their appraisal was 
predicted by the sign of the feedback. Managers in 
this study were more satisfied with positive feedback 
than with negative feedback. This body of research 
suggests that positive feedback is positively related 
to feedback acceptance.
Research suggests that inflated appraisals will be 
readily accepted by employees (Ilgen et al., 1979). 
Inflated appraisal presumably gives ratees the 
perception that their performance is at least 
acceptable. Therefore, ratees will believe that there 
is no need for improvement. Thus, the present 
research will investigate the hypothesis that 
politically inflated appraisal will not be associated 
with desire to respond to the feedback (H2).
Negative feedback tends not to be as readily 
accepted as positive feedback (Landy & Farr, 1983). 
Recent research has shown negative feedback to lead to
the belief that the rater has an inaccurate impression 
of ratee performance (Coleman, Jussim, & Abraham,
1987). Acceptance of negative feedback will be even 
lower (thus lowered goal setting) if the source is 
lacking in credibility. Research by Podsakoff and 
Farh (1989) suggested that negative feedback led to 
increased goal setting only if the source was seen as 
credible. The present study will investigate the 
hypothesis that ratings which are perceived to be 
deflated for political reasons will not be accepted as 
accurate by ratees (H3). Additionally, deflated 
ratings could potentially have effects on employee 
attitudes (Pearce & Porter, 1986). The present study 
will test the hypothesis that ratings deflated for 
political reasons will be associated with reduced 
trust in the source, the appraisal process, and the 
organization itself (H4).
Feedback Consistency. Research has shown that 
inconsistent feedback is not accepted as readily as 
consistent feedback (Stone & Stone, 1985). Ilgen et 
al. (1979) assume that inconsistent feedback may 
confuse the recipient or be attributed to sources 
beyond the employee's control and therefore not be
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accepted. As inconsistent feedback is less accepted, 
it is assumed that it could lead to reduced employee 
motivation and performance.
As previously discussed, Longenecker (1989) 
provides evidence that there may be politically 
motivated inconsistency between spoken appraisal and 
the appraisal that is written for administrative 
purposes. For example, written appraisals (for 
administrative purposes) may be inflated while the 
spoken message is more negative. This could be due to 
managers' reluctance to adversely affect employee 
compensation and various other motivations (presented 
earlier). Managers may then give more accurate spoken 
feedback to employees.
Alternatively, due to other political reasons 
(e.g., budgetary constraints) the written appraisal 
may be more negative than the spoken appraisal. For 
example, a manager may feel organizational pressures 
not to give superior ratings due to the consequences 
in terms of merit pay increases. However, spoken 
feedback may indicate the employee did, in fact, 
exhibit superior performance.
25
The present study will investigate the hypothesis 
that politically motivated inconsistent feedback will 
be associated with reduced acceptance and reduced 
desire to respond to the feedback (H5). Additionally, 
the hypothesis that the perception of politically 
biased inconsistency in the rating process is 
associated with reduced trust in the appraisal source, 
the appraisal process, and the organization itself, 
will be tested (H6).
Absence of Feedback. Research by Ashford (1986) 
and Ashford and Cummings (1983) suggests that 
performance feedback is a valued resource for 
employees. These authors posit that individuals who 
do not receive adequate feedback will attempt to 
obtain it from organizational and other sources.
Recent research (Longenecker & Gioia, 1988) suggests 
that organizational politics may cause managers not to 
receive adequate feedback.
Longenecker and Gioia (1988) provided evidence 
that high level executives desire, yet do not receive, 
regular performance feedback. Managers reported that 
a lack of appraisal led to a negative attitude toward 
their supervisors, increased anxiety and frustration,
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and a poorer job of appraising their own subordinates. 
Additionally, McCarty (1986) demonstrated that a lack 
of feedback was associated with lowered 
self-confidence and expected performance in both men 
and women.
The preceding sections address the effects of 
appraisal politics on motivation through the 
feedback-performance process (Ilgen et al., 1979). It 
is possible that perceptions of political appraisal 
behavior could have additional effects on employees 
through employees' feelings of inequity (Adams,
1965). The link between inequity and negative 
outcomes (e.g., reduced motivation; negative job 
attitudes) is well established in the organizational 
sciences literature (for a review, see Greenberg,
1982). The possible effects of politically biased 
appraisals on equity perceptions are presented in the 
following section.
Equity and Fairness Perceptions in 
Performance Appraisal
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) suggests that 
employees compare their ratio of inputs (e.g., 
performance) to outcomes (e.g., appraisal,
compensation) to some internal standard and/or a 
comparison other. The relation between 
inequity/unfairness and negative outcomes has been 
well established by researchers (Greenberg, 1982). 
Although much of the research on equity has been done 
in the reward allocation area (e.g., distributive 
justice), recent research has shown the importance of 
procedural factors in determining rewards (e.g., 
procedural justice; for a review, see Greenberg,
1986). Additionally, researchers have investigated 
the role of distributive and procedural justice 
(fairness) in the area of performance appraisal 
(Dipboye & de Pontbriand, 1981; Greenberg, 1986;
Landy, Barnes-Farrell, & Cleveland, 1980; Landy, 
Barnes, & Murphy, 1978).
The importance of perceived fairness (equity) in 
performance appraisal has been highlighted by 
Greenberg (1986). He delineated determinants of 
perceived performance appraisal fairness. Respondents 
indicated that there were both distributive and 
procedural factors that determined fairness and 
satisfaction with the appraisal process. These 
procedural factors include rater familiarity with
ratee's work, consistent application of standards, 
receipt of rating based on performance achieved, and 
recommendations for salary/promotion being based on 
the appraisal. Additionally, a study by Folger and 
Konovsky (1989) found procedural justice factors in 
pay raise determination to account for more variance 
than distributive justice factors in the dependent 
variables trust in supervisor and organizational 
commitment. It is apparent from this research that 
fairness is an important determinant of employee 
satisfaction with performance appraisal systems.
It is possible that perceptions of political bias 
affect motivation through employee perceptions of 
unfairness in the appraisal system. Employees may 
feel that they are receiving equal or lesser outcomes 
for superior performance if they perceive political 
bias in the ratings; therefore, they may feel that the 
appraisal system is unfair. When this is the case, 
their subsequent motivation could be reduced.
Further, satisfaction and commitment to the 
organization and the appraisal system could also be 
reduced. The present study will investigate the
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relationship between inequity and employee attitudes 
and desire to respond to feedback (H7).
Due to past research that demonstrated individuals 
have a greater tolerance for positive inequity (e.g., 
outcomes greater than inputs; Lane & Messe', 1972) it 
is hypothesized that politically inflated appraisals 
will not be associated with greater desire to respond 
to feedback (H2). However, when employees believe 
that other employees have received inflated ratings 
(while they have received accurate or deflated ones) 
inequity perceptions may be experienced. The present 
study will investigate the hypothesis that inequity 
perceptions will be associated with reduced desire to 
respond to feedback (H7).
Further, in the case where employees perceive that 
other employees have received politically inflated 
ratings, it is hypothesized that trust in the 
appraisal source, organization, and appraisal system 
will be reduced (H7a). Additionally, the hypothesis 
that felt inequity will be associated with reduced 
trust in appraisal process and in the organization, 
will be tested (H8). Finally, the hypothesis that 
inequity perceptions will be associated with lowered
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belief in appraisal system value will be 
investigated (H9).
As previously discussed, research by Longenecker 
(1989) suggested that verbal feedback from supervisors 
may differ from written feedback (e.g., for 
administrative purposes). Written feedback can be 
more positive than spoken or vice versa.
Research on inequity in organizations (e.g., 
Greenberg, 1982) suggests that when employees do not 
receive rewards due them, motivation will be reduced 
and negative job attitudes will increase. In the 
event that verbal feedback differs from written 
feedback it is suggested that these negative outcomes 
will be manifested. For example, a case where a 
manager tells an employee he/she is doing an 
"outstanding" job yet the appraisal reads 
"satisfactory" could lead to reduced acceptance and 
desire to respond to feedback (H5a) and also to 
reduced trust in rater and in the appraisal process 
(H6a). The present research will test 
these hypotheses.
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Overview of the Present Study
Despite the vast amount of past research on 
performance appraisal, there remain areas in need of 
further study. Prior appraisal research has not 
adequately addressed the issues of how performance 
appraisal is conducted in organizations or the 
motivations of raters in organizations. In response 
to this, recent research has demonstrated that raters 
in organizations have numerous motivations other than 
rating accuracy. Whereas researchers have identified 
a number of political motivations that might cause 
raters to distort ratings, the effects of these 
distortions have not been investigated.
The consequences of distorted ratings warrant 
research for several reasons. Accepted feedback is a 
necessary component of the performance 
appraisal-performance improvement process. If 
politically motivated distortions reduce feedback 
acceptance, employee motivation may be reduced. 
Additionally, perceptions of inequity in appraisal 
have been demonstrated to have negative consequences. 
If politically motivated distortions lead to inequity 
perceptions, negative outcomes may result.
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Managers may believe that they are distorting 
ratings for valid reasons. However, the potential 
negative results of the distortions may outweigh any 
intended benefit of their use. The present study is 
an attempt to determine the consequences of 
politically motivated distortions in 
performance appraisal.
The present research will use the 1979 Ilgen et 
al. feedback model, along with research evidence from 
goal setting and equity theories of motivation, as 
starting points in investigating the effects of 
politically motivated rating distortion on ratee 
attitudes and desire to respond to feedback.
Toward a Model of Politics in Performance Appraisal
As the literature supporting the hypotheses of the 
present study comes from various theories, it is hoped 
that the results of this research will be a first step 
in developing a model of the effects of politics in 
performance appraisal. This model (See Figure 2) 
could take the form of: The general construct of







Figure 2. Tentative model of the effects of politics 
in performance appraisal.
experiences with politics (e.g., inflation, deflation, 
inconsistency, inequity). Personal experiences with 
politics might then lead to psychological processes 
such as perceived equity, trust (in organization, 
rater, appraisal process), perceived value of the 
appraisal system, and acceptance of appraisal 
feedback. Finally, these psychological processes 
might lead to desire to respond to appraisal feedback. 
The viability of such a model will be further 
addressed in the discussion section of this paper. 
Hypotheses
The present research consists of two studies, a 
vignette manipulation experiment and a field survey. 
Previous sections discussed literature on politics in 
performance appraisal, performance feedback, and 
equity theory. Hypotheses were developed, based on 
these bodies of research, concerning employee 
attitudes and desire to respond to feedback. These 
hypotheses are presented in the following sections. 
Hypotheses are presented separately due to the fact 
that study 1 involves manipulations of politics in 
appraisal and study 2 deals with perceptions of 
politics in appraisal. Numbered hypotheses in each
study are essentially identical except for the 
aforementioned difference. Hypothesis 1 could not be 
tested in the simulation study.
Study 1 (Simulation)
H2: Ratings inflated due to political factors
will have no effect on desire to respond to 
appraisal feedback.
H3: Ratings deflated due to political factors
will result in lower rating acceptance.
H4: Politically motivated deflation of ratings
will result in lower trust in the rater, the 
organization, and the appraisal process.
H5: Politically motivated inconsistency between
written appraisal and verbal feedback during 
the appraisal interview will result in lower 
desire to respond to appraisal feedback and 
rating acceptance.
H5a: Ratees receiving verbal feedback at the 
appraisal interview which is more 
positive than their written appraisal 
will have a lower desire to respond to 





written feedback is more positive than 
or equal to their spoken feedback. 
Politically motivated inconsistency between 
written appraisal and verbal feedback in the 
appraisal interview will result in lower 
trust in rater and the appraisal process.
H6a: Ratees receiving verbal feedback at the 
appraisal interview which is more 
positive than their written appraisal 
will have lower trust in the rater and 
in the appraisal process.
Inequity in the appraisal process will result 
in lower desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback.
H7a: When co-workers receive inflated
ratings, ratees who did not receive 
inflated ratings will have lower desire 
to respond to appraisal feedback. 
Inequity in performance appraisal will result 
in lower trust in rater, the appraisal 








Inequity in performance appraisal will result 
in lower perceptions of the value of the 
appraisal system to the organization.
Study 2 (Field Survey)
Perception of politics in the appraisal 
process will be negatively associated with 
rating acceptance, trust in rater, and 
perception of appraisal system value.
Ratings perceived to be inflated due to 
political factors will have no association 
with desire to respond to appraisal feedback. 
Ratees' perceptions that their ratings are 
deflated due to political factors will be 
negatively associated with rating acceptance. 
Perceived politically motivated deflation of 
ratings will be negatively associated with 
trust in rater, the organization, and the 
appraisal process.
Ratee perception of politically motivated 
inconsistency between written appraisal and 
verbal feedback during the appraisal 
interview will be negatively associated with
desire to respond to appraisal feedback and 
rating acceptance.
H6: Perception of politically motivated
inconsistency between written appraisal and 
verbal feedback in the appraisal interview 
will be negatively associated with trust in 
rater and the appraisal process.
H7: Ratee perception of inequity in the appraisal
process will be negatively associated with 
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.
H8: Ratee perception of inequity in the appraisal
process will be negatively associated with 
trust in rater, the appraisal process and 
the organization.
H9: Inequity in performance appraisal will be
negatively associated with perceptions of the 
value of the appraisal system to 
the organization.
Overview of Methodology 
The present research consisted of two studies. 
Study 1 manipulated all independent variables through 
the use of vignettes. In study l, subjects completed 
questionnnaires after reading vignettes describing 
their hypothetical rating and the hypothetical 
organizational conditions surrounding it. This 
study assessed the extent to which manipulations of 
organizational politics affect ratee attitudes and 
ratee desire to respond to feedback in an 
experimental design.
Study 2 assessed the extent to which perceptions 
of organizational politics in the appraisal process 
were associated with ratee desire to respond to 
appraisal feedback and with ratee attitudes toward 
appraisal. Subjects completed a survey measuring 
their perceptions of their organization's appraisal 
system, their attitudes toward it, and their desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback. Hypotheses concerning 
the relationships between appraisal politics and ratee 
motivation and attitudes were tested.
This two-part methodology was designed to achieve 
two purposes. Study 1 allowed manipulation of
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politics and ratings by simulation whereas otherwise 
these variables would have been impossible to 
manipulate. Study 2 was designed to maximize 
generalizability by assessing perceptions of politics 
and performance appraisal as they existed in an actual 
organization. Therefore external and internal 
validity should have been maximized by the two-part 




The subjects for this research were 47 employees 
from a large international consulting firm and 50 
employees from a large midwestern insurance company. 
Subjects were selected on the basis of 1) having been 
recipients of annual or semi-annual formal performance 
reviews and 2) that they would continue to receive 
performance evaluations.
Surveys were randomly distributed by a contact 
person in each organization. Subjects from the 
consulting firm were professional level employees 
(e.g., managers, partners, consultants) located in 
offices throughout the southwest United States.
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Subjects from the insurance company were professional 
level employees (e.g., managers, district managers, 
agents) working in offices throughout one midwestern 
state. Of the 108 distributed in the consulting firm, 
47 were completed, yielding a response rate of 43.5%. 
Of the 162 distributed in the insurance company, 50 
were completed, yielding a response rate of 30.8%.
The overall response rate was 35.9%.
The consulting firm sub-sample contained 36 males 
and 11 females. Of these subjects, 34% were between 
the ages of 20 and 29, 38.3% were between the ages of 
3 0 and 39, 21.3% were between the ages of 40 and 49, 
and 3% were over the age of 50. Further, 42.6% had 
been employed in their job for less than 5 years, 34% 
for between 5 and 10 years, and 23.4% over 10 years.
The insurance company sub-sample was made up of 33 
males and 17 females. Of these subjects, 22% were 
between the ages of 20 and 29, 28% were between the 
ages of 30 and 39, 34% were between the ages of 40 and 
49, and 16% were over the age of 50. Of these 
subjects, 32% had been employed at their present job 
for less than 5 years, 28% for between 5 and 10 years, 
and 40% for over 10 years.
Therefore the entire sample consisted of 69 males 
and 28 females. Furthermore, 27.8% were between the 
ages of 20 and 29, 3 3% were between the ages of 3 0 and 
39, 27.8% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and 
11.3% were over the age of 50. Of these subjects, 
37.1% had been employed at their present job for less 
than 5 years, 30.9% for between 5 and 10 years, and 
3 2% for over 10 years.
Procedure
The contact person in each company randomly 
distributed packets of materials to employees (one per 
subject). This packet contained a cover letter 
(Appendix A) which explained the study to the partici­
pants and assured confidentiality. Also included in 
the packet was one of 27 vignettes which are described 
in the following section. Each subject received only 
one vignette. The vignette requested subjects to 
assume that they received a certain rating given the 
circumstances described in the vignette.
Additionally, subjects completed a questionnaire 
assessing reactions to political use of performance 
appraisal and desire to respond to appraisal feedback, 
given the appraisal and organizational conditions
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described in the vignette. Subjects mailed the 
questionnaire directly to the researcher to insure 
confidentiality.
Vignettes
Due to the fact that the present study could not 
manipulate politics and ratings in the participating 
organizations, the independent variables were 
manipulated through vignettes. The instructions 
(Appendix B) told subjects to assume that they 
received the rating described in the vignette, given 
the organizational conditions described. The 
vignettes (Appendix C) varied the level of political 
bias in the subject's ratings (inflated, deflated, 
accurate) and ratings of co-workers (inflated, 
deflated, accurate). Additionally, the level of 
agreement between the subjects' written and spoken 
feedback (written > spoken, spoken > written, no 
inconsistency) was varied. Manipulations of political 
inflation, deflation, and rating inconsistency were 
developed using factors identified by Longenecker et 
al. (1987). Each vignette described the subject's
written rating, spoken feedback, and ''actual 
performance." Additionally, ratings of co-workers,
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and possible political motivations of the organization 
and supervisor were provided. For example, subjects 
(in one experimental condition) may have been told 
that they received a rating of "outstanding" (a "7" on 
a seven-point scale), whereas their actual performance 
was "above average" (a "5"), due to their supervisors 
wishing to avoid conflict with them.
Using a methodology similar to Greenhaus, Seidel, 
and Marinis (1983), variables (inflation/deflation of 
subjects' ratings, inflation/deflation of others' 
ratings, inconsistency between written and spoken 
feedback) were presented in all possible combinations 
thus yielding 27 separate vignettes. The vignettes 
were randomly distributed to the subjects.
Study 1 was, therefore, a 3 (subject 
rating— inflated, deflated, accurate) X 3 (co-workers' 
rating— inflated, deflated, accurate) X 3 (subjects' 
written vs. spoken appraisal— spoken > written, 
written > spoken, written = spoken) factorial design. 
Dependent Variables
Due to a lack of available suitable scales of the 
dependent variables of this study, the variables were 
measured by a 25-item tailor-made survey instrument
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(Appendix D). All items, except demographics, were 
measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale. Demographic 
and manipulation check items brought the total number 
of items to 35.
Acceptance of Feedback. The extent to which 
subjects accepted their ratings as accurate indicators 
of their performance was measured by four items (e.g., 
"Based on my performance, I was accurately 
evaluated"). This scale used some items adapted from 
the TAPS scale on ratee perceptions of the appraisal 
process by Bernardin et al. (1981). Additional items 
were adapted for use from scales on ratee attitudes on 
performance feedback by Landy et al. (1978) and 
Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981). Coefficient alpha 
was .90.
Trust in the Organization. Subjects' trust in the 
hypothetical organization was measured by a four-item 
measure. Items (e.g., "I trust this organization to 
act in my best interest") are similar to those from 
various scales of job involvement, organizational 
commitment, and organizational climate which appear in 
Cook, Hepworth, Wall, and Warr (1981). Coefficient 
alpha was .69.
Trust in the Appraisal Process. Subjects' trust 
in the hypothetical organization's appraisal process 
was measured by five items (e.g., "The performance 
appraisal process in this organization can be 
trusted"). Items were adapted for inclusion from a 
measure of fairness by Folger and Konovsky (1989). 
Additional items were included which were designed to 
be similar to those addressing trust in the appraisal 
process from various scales of job involvement, 
organizational commitment, and organizational climate 
which appear in Cook et al. (1981). Coefficient alpha 
was .89.
Trust in the Rater. Subjects' trust in the rater 
was measured by four items (e.g., "I trust the 
supervisor who gave me this rating"). Some items for 
this scale were adapted for inclusion from a measure 
of fairness by Folger and Konovsky (1989). Additional 
items were included which were written to be congruent 
with those tapping rater trust from various sub-scales 
of job involvement measures which appear in Cook et 
al. (1981). Coefficient alpha was .84.
Desire to Respond to Appraisal Feedback.
Subjects' desire to respond to appraisal feedback was 
measured using a scale designed to be similar to 
various job involvement scales appearing in Cook et 
al. (1981). Additional items were adapted from a 
scale on ratee intentions to improve performance by 
Platz (1985). Subjects' agreement with each of the 
four items (e.g., "This performance appraisal makes me 
feel motivated to perform effectively") was measured 
by a Likert-type scale. Coefficient alpha was .85.
Appraisal System Value. Subjects' perceptions of 
the value of the hypothetical organization's 
performance appraisal system were measured by four 
items (e.g., "The performance appraisal system in this 
organization is a worthwhile use of resources"). Some 
items from a measure of employee reactions to 
appraisal systems by Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981) 
were adapted for inclusion. Additional items were 
written to be similar to those dealing with the value 
of performance appraisal from various scales of job 
involvement, organizational commitment, and 
organizational climate which appear in Cook et al. 
(1981). Coefficient alpha was .71.
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Manipulation check items. Manipulation check 
items were also included in the questionnaire. These 
items assessed the extent to which manipulations of 
rating inflation, deflation, and consistency were 
successful. For each item (e.g., My written appraisal 
was more negative than verbal feedback from my 
supervisor"), subjects indicated their level of 
agreement on a five-point Likert-type scale. These 
items appear on the last page of Appendix D.
Demographics. Subjects* sex, age, years of 
employment, and years of employment at their present 
job were measured by four items. These items were 
placed at the end of the survey because research by 
Roberson and Sundstrom (1990) found that subjects were 
more likely to complete and return questionnaires when 
demographic items appeared at the end of 
the instrument.
Analysis
Study 1 was analyzed by a 3 [subject 
rating— inflated (n = 26), deflated (n — 37), accurate 
(n = 34)] X 3 [co-workers* rating— inflated (n = 24), 
deflated (n = 38), accurate (n = 35)] X 3 [(subjects' 
written vs. spoken appraisal— spoken > written (n =
49




To test the effectiveness of the vignette 
manipulations, 3 X 3 X 3  factorial ANOVAs were 
performed. Results indicated significant main effects 
for subject rating on the manipulation check items 
assessing inflation (F,(2,71) = 62.03, p < .0001), 
deflation (F,(2,71) = 97.77, p < .0001), and accuracy 
(F,(2,71) = 89.47, p < .0001) of ratings.
Subsequent Tukey's Studentized Range (HSD) 
analyses indicated that subjects receiving inflated 
ratings had significantly higher mean agreement (M = 
1.85, n = 26) with the item assessing inflation of 
rating than subjects receiving accurate (M = 4.08, n = 
34) or deflated (M = 4.05, n = 37) ratings. 
Additionally, analyses indicated that subjects 
receiving deflated ratings had significantly higher 
mean agreement (M = 2.14, n = 37) with the item 
assessing deflation of rating than subjects receiving 
accurate (M = 4.26, n — 34) or inflated (M = 4.00, n = 
26) ratings. Further, subjects receiving accurate
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ratings had significantly higher mean agreement (M = 
1.88, n = 34) with the item assessing accuracy of 
rating than subjects receiving inflated (M = 4.08, n =
26) or deflated (M = 4.19, n = 37) ratings.
Additional ANOVA results indicated significant 
main effects for positive inconsistency (written 
appraisal higher than verbal appraisal) (F,(2,71) =
94.68, p < .0001), negative inconsistency (verbal 
higher than written) (F,(2,71) = 124.26, e  < .0001),
and no inconsistency (F,(2,71) = 85.40, e  < .0001)
manipulations of subject ratings on the manipulation 
check items designed to assess negative, positive, and 
no inconsistency in appraisal, respectively.
As in the previously discussed results, subsequent 
HSD tests indicated that subjects had significantly 
higher agreement with the manipulation check item 
assessing their given condition than subjects in the 
remaining conditions. Therefore, manipulations of 
subject inflation, deflation, accurate, positive 
inconsistency, negative inconsistency, and no 
inconsistency were judged to be effective.
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Interrelationships among Variables
As previously mentioned, Study 1 manipulated the 
variables: Subject rating, co-worker rating, and
inconsistency between written and spoken appraisal.
The dependent variables: Acceptance of rating, trust
in the organization, trust in the rater, trust in the 
appraisal process, and perceived value of the 
appraisal system were measured. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations 
for the dependent measures.
Analysis of Variance
In order to test the Hypotheses of Study 1, 
separate 3 X 3 X 3  factorial ANOVAs were performed. 
Results of these analyses are presented in Tables 2 
through 7. As mentioned above, cell sizes were not 
equal in Study l. To deal with this issue, a General 
Linear Model (GLM) approach to ANOVA was used. This 
approach, suggested by Kirk (1983), helps to minimize 
the effects of unequal cell sizes. The GLM approach 
is preferred because it encompasses all ANOVA and 
regression models. For the purposes of hypothesis
T a b l e  1
i t i o n i  i a o n a  v a r i a b l e
V » r i a 0 t e M * SO i . 5 3 . , 5 . 6 .
1 . Acc e p t 97 1 A . 2 5 . 23 . 90
2 . Trust ( 0 ) 97 1 A . 0 3 . 5 A . 41 AO* .49
3 . Trust (?) 97 19.2 a . as . 4 5 A 3 * . 7885 * . 39
A , Trust (R > 97 1 A . 9 A . 3 A .7179 • .4528" . 4 7A9* . 8 A
5 . Dts. Res. 97 1 A . 1 A . 1 2 . 43 1 8* . 4445 " .4477" .7598* .85
6 . A p p . v a I . 97 1 A . 2 3.52 . 5 A46* .7383" . 7772" .5920* .5537" .71
*p < . 000 1
C o e f f i c i e n t  alph a s are p r e s e n t e d  a l o n g the d i ag o n a l  
V a r i a b l e  naats;
1. A c c e p t a n c e  of r a t in g
2. Trust in o r g a n i z a t i o n
3. Trust in a p p r a i s a l  p r o c e s s
A, Trust in r at er
5. O e s i re  to r e s p o n d  to a p p r a i s a l  f e e d b a c k
6. P e r c e i v e d  a p p r a i s a l  s y s t e a  value
In all v a r i a b l e s ,  h i g h e r  s c o r e s  r e p r e s e n t  loner v a r i a b l e  val ue s
in
to
testing, Type III sums of squares were interpreted so 
as to yield a more conservative test of the 
hypotheses. Significant main effects are presented by 
independent variable. Significant interactions are 
presented following a summary of main effects. [Note: 
it is acknowledged that several authors (e.g., Kirk, 
1982; Ott, Larson & Mendenhall, 1983) would suggest 
that main effects are rendered uninterpretable when 
interaction effects are present. However, for clarity 
of presentation, main effects and interactions are 
presented separately. It is the present author's 
position that the small cell sizes for the 
interactions (discussed in later section) make the 
interactions virtually uninterpretable. The issue of 
interactions is also addressed in the discussion 
section.]
Inflation of ratings. Hypothesis 2 (the first 
hypothesis tested in Study 1) predicted that inflation 
of subject ratings would have no effect on subjects' 
desire to respond to appraisal feedback. ANOVA 
results (see Table 2) indicated a main effect for 
subject rating on desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback (F(2,71) = 11.84, p < .0001, omega squared =
Table 2 
ANOVA results for d e s i re to r e spond to appraisal f e e d b a c k
•
Source df S S H S F p < F
H o d e I 25 75 5.76 30.23 2.46 .0017
Error 71 873.5 8 12.30
Total 96 1629.34
Sources d f S S F P < t
R ating ( R ) 2 3 13.14 12.73 . 000 1
C o - w o r k e r s  (C) 2 46.63 1.89 .15 79
D i s c r e p a n c y  (D ) 2 13.43 . 5 5 .5818
R X C 4 12.93 . 26 . 9 0 09
R X D 4 112.92 2.29 . 0676
C X D 4 23.42 .48 . 7533
R X C X D 7 23 3 . 2 9 2.71 .0151
.173). Follow-up Tukey's (HSD) procedures indicated 
that subjects who received inflated ratings (M =
14.19, n = 24) did not significantly differ from 
subjects receiving deflated ratings (M = 16.05, n =
37) on mean desire to respond to feedback. However, 
subjects who received accurate ratings (M = 11.85, n = 
34) indicated significantly greater desire to respond 
to feedback than subjects receiving inflated ratings 
(M = 14.19). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported.
Deflation of ratings. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
ratings deflated due to political factors would result 
in lower rating acceptance. ANOVA results (see Table 
3) indicated a significant main effect (F(2,71) = 
54.69, p < .0001, omega squared = .394) for subject 
rating on rating acceptance.
Differences between all group means were 
significant in this analysis. Subjects receiving 
deflated ratings (M = 17.81, n = 37) had significantly 
lower rating acceptance than subjects who received 
inflated ratings (M = 14.86, n = 26), whose ratings 
were also lower than subjects who received accurate 
ratings (M = 9.79, n = 34), supporting Hypothesis 3.
T a b l e  3
A N O V A  R e s u l t s  f o r  a c c e p t a n c e  of r a t i n g
S o u r c e  d f SS H S
Model 25 1 9 4 9 . 8 8  79.80
Error 71 6 7 5 . 6 7  9.52
Total 96 2 6 2 5 . 5 4
S o u r c e s  d f SS
Rating CR) 2 1157.35
C o - u o r k e r s  (C) 2 21.96
D i s c r e p a n c y  (D) 2 70.47
R X C 4 13 1.30
R X D 4 178.16
C X D 4 2 1.32
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that subjects who received
deflated ratings would have lower trust in the rater,
lower trust in the organization, and lower trust in 
the appraisal process. Analyses indicated main 
effects for subject rating on trust in the rater (see 
Table 4) (F(2,71) = 16.85, p < .0001, omega squared =
.209), trust in organization (see Table 5) (F(2,71) =
12.46, p < .0001, omega squared = .153), and trust in 
the appraisal process (see Table 6) (F(2,71) = 13.92,
p < .0001, omega squared = .153).
HSD analyses indicated that subjects receiving
accurate ratings (M = 12.68, n = 34) and subjects who 
received inflated ratings (M = 14.85, n = 26) had 
significantly higher mean trust in the rater than 
subjects who received deflated ratings (M = 16.97, n = 
37). Further, subjects receiving accurate ratings had 
significantly higher mean trust in the organization (M 
= 11.82, n = 34) than subjects receiving deflated 
ratings (M = 15.84, n = 37) and subjects receiving 
inflated ratings (M = 14.23, n = 26). Finally, 
subjects receiving accurate ratings had significantly 
higher mean trust in the appraisal process (M = 16.59, 
n = 34) than subjects who received deflated ratings (M
Table 4
AHOVA r e s u l t s  f o r  t r u s t  i n  t h e  r a t e r
Source____________ df_____________SJ>_______ H_S______
Model 2 5 9 9 2 . 6 9  39.70
Error 71 8 1 8 . 2 8  11.53
Total 96 1 8 1 0 . 9 7
S o urces d f S S ___
R ating (R) 2 3 2 7 . 1 7  14
C o - w o r k e r s  (C) 2 2 9 .02 1
D i s c r e p a n c y  (D) 2 7 0 .28 3
R X C 4 29.61
R X D  4 169.32 3
C X 0 4 16.15
R X C X O  7 3 5 1 . 1 3  4
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ANOVA r e s u l t s  f o r  t r u s t  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n
Source_____________d_f_____________S_S_______ M_S____
Model 25 659.50 26.38
Error 71 540.50 7.61
Total 96 1200.00
S o u r c e s  d f SS
Ra t i n g  (R) 2 287.42 18.88
C o - w o r k e r s  (C) 2 152.51 10.02
D i s c r e p a n c y  (0) 2 12.61 .80
R X C  4 0.00 0.00
R X 0 4 16.74 .55
C X D  4 24.63 .81
R X C X D  7 191.92 3.60
P < F
4 7 .0001
P < F 
. 0 0 0 1 
. 0 0 0 1 
. 4 539 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
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= 21.65, n = 37). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was 
supported by these results.
Additional ANOVA results (see Table 7) indicated a 
significant main effect for subject rating (F(2,71) = 
9.55, p < .001, omega squared = .12) on perceived 
appraisal system value. Tukey's (HSD) analyses 
indicated that subjects whose ratings were deflated 
had lower mean perceived appraisal system value than 
subjects receiving accurate ratings (M = 15.54, n = 37 
vs. M = 12.62, n = 34). There were no mean 
differences on this variable between subjects who 
received inflated ratings and subjects who received 
accurate ratings (M = 14.27, n = 26 vs. M = 12.62, n = 
34) .
Inconsistency between written and verbal rating. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that politically motivated 
inconsistency between written and verbal feedback 
would result in lower rating acceptance and desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback. Additionally, 
Hypothesis 5a predicted that subjects receiving verbal 
feedback which was more positive than their written 
appraisal would have lower desire to respond to 
appraisal feedback than subjects whose written
T a b l e  7
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appraisal was equal to or more positive than their 
verbal feedback. ANOVA results indicated no main 
effect (see Table 3) for inconsistency between written 
and verbal feedback on rating acceptance (F(2,71) = 
1.34, n.s.) nor on desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback (see Table 2)(F(2,71) = 2.14, n.s.). These 
results failed to support Hypotheses 5 and 5a.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that politically 
motivated inconsistency between written and spoken 
performance appraisal feedback would result in lower 
trust in the rater and lower trust in the appraisal 
process. Additionally, Hypothesis 6a predicted that 
these dependent variables would be lower when written 
appraisal was less positive than spoken feedback. 
Analyses indicated a main effect for inconsistency on 
trust in the rater (see Table 4) (F(2,7l) = 3.67, p <
.05) but not for trust in the appraisal process (see 
Table 6) (F(2,71) = 2.55, n.s.).
HSD tests indicated that subjects who received 
consistent feedback had higher trust in the rater (M =
13.68, n = 31) than subjects who received written 
appraisal more positive than spoken feedback (positive 
inconsistency) (M = 15.68, n = 31) and subjects
receiving written appraisal which was more negative 
than their spoken feedback (negative inconsistency) (M 
= 15.29, n = 35). There were no mean differences 
between subjects receiving negative and positive 
inconsistency on trust in the rater. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6 was supported only for trust in the rater 
but not for trust in the appraisal process. Negative 
inconsistency (written < verbal feedback) affected 
subj ects1 trust in the rater only when compared to 
subjects who received consistent ratings, thereby 
offering partial support for Hypothesis 6a.
Additional ANOVA results indicated a significant 
main effect for rating inconsistency (see Table 7)
(F(2,71) = 3.66, p < .05, omega squared = .042) on 
perceived appraisal system value. Results of Tukey's 
(HSD) analyses indicated that subjects whose written 
rating was lower than their spoken feedback had higher 
mean perceived appraisal system value (M = 13.31, n = 
31) than subjects who received consistent ratings (M =
15.19, n = 31). There were no mean differences 
between subjects whose written ratings were greater 
than their spoken feedback (M = 14.13, n = 31) and
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subjects who received consistent ratings (M = 15.19, n 
= 31) .
Inequity in appraisal. Hypothesis 7 predicted 
that inequity in the appraisal process would result in 
lower desire to respond to appraisal feedback. ANOVA 
results (see Table 2) indicated that there was no main 
effect (F (2,71) = .92, n.s.) for inequity in 
co-workers' ratings on desire to respond to feedback, 
failing to support Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 7a predicted that, when co-workers' 
ratings were inflated, subjects receiving accurate 
ratings and subjects receiving deflated ratings would 
have lower desire to respond to appraisal feedback 
than subjects receiving accurate ratings. ANOVA 
results (see Table 2) indicated no significant 
interaction between subject rating and co-workers' 
ratings (F(4,71) = 0.43, n.s.) on desire to respond to 
feedback, failing to support Hypothesis 7a.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that inequity in the 
appraisal process would result in lower trust in the 
rater, trust in the organization, and trust in the 
appraisal process. Analyses indicated main effects 
for co-worker rating on trust in the organization (see
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Table 5) (F(2,71) = 6.44, p < .0001, omega squared =
.076) and trust in the appraisal process (see Table 6) 
(F(2,71) = 7.81, p < .001, omega squared = .083).
There was no main effect for inequity in co-workers' 
rating on trust in the rater (see Table 4) (F(2,71) =
.33, n.s.).
HSD tests indicated that subjects having 
co-workers who received accurate ratings had 
significantly higher mean trust in the organization (M 
= 12.86, n = 35) than subjects having co-workers who 
received inflated ratings (M = 16.08, n = 24).
However, there were no mean differences in trust in 
the organization between subjects having co-workers 
who received deflated ratings (M = 13.74, n = 38) and 
those having co-workers who received accurate ratings 
(M = 12.86, n = 35). Further, subjects who had 
co-workers who received accurate ratings had 
significantly higher mean trust in the appraisal 
process (M = 17.37, n = 35) than subjects having 
co-workers who received inflated ratings (M = 21.38, n 
= 24) or deflated ratings (M = 19.45, n = 38). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was fully supported for trust 
in the appraisal process but was only partially
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supported for trust in the organization. In the case 
where co-worker's ratings were inflated, subjects 
reported lower trust in the organization. There was 
no support for the effects of inequity on trust in the 
rater.
Hypothesis 9 predicted that inequity in ratings 
would result in lower perceived value of the appraisal 
system. Analyses indicated that there was a 
significant main effect (see Table 7) (F(2,71) =
7.90, p < .001, omega squared = .099) for co-workers' 
ratings on perceived appraisal system value.
HSD analyses indicated that subjects having 
co-workers who received accurate ratings had 
significantly higher mean perceived appraisal system 
value (M = 13.00, n = 35) than subjects having 
co-workers who received inflated ratings (M = 16.04, n 
= 24). However, there were no mean differences in 
perceived appraisal system value between subjects 
having co-workers who received deflated ratings (M = 
14.08, n = 38) and those having co-workers who 
received accurate ratings (M = 13.00, n = 35). 
Therefore Hypothesis 9 was supported for perceived
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appraisal system value only in the case where 
co-worker's ratings were inflated.
Organization Effects
The only significant main effect for subjects' 
organization was on trust in the appraisal process (F 
(1,55) = 4.54, n < -05, omega squared = .017).
Subjects in the consulting firm had significantly 
higher mean (M = 18.04, n = 47) trust in the appraisal 
process versus subjects in the insurance company (M = 
20.24, n = 50). There were no other main effects for 
organization on any of the dependent measures.
Summary
In summary, Hypotheses 3 and 4 were supported by 
the data, and Hypotheses 6, 6a, 8, and 9 were 
partially supported by the data. Subjects who 
received deflated ratings had lower trust in the 
rater, trust in the organization, trust in the 
appraisal process, perceived appraisal system value, 
and lower acceptance of rating. Additionally subjects 
who received inflated ratings had lower desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback than subjects who 
received accurate ratings.
Further, subjects having co-workers who received 
accurate (equitable) ratings had greater trust in the 
rater and greater perceived appraisal system value 
than subjects having co-workers who received inflated 
(inequitable) ratings. Finally, subjects receiving 
inconsistent feedback (their verbal feedback was more 
positive or negative than their written feedback) had 
lower trust in the rater and perceived appraisal 
system value. Hypotheses 2, 5, 5a, 7 and 7a were not 
supported by the data. The results failed to support 
the hypothesized non-significant relationship between 
rating inflation and rating acceptance. In this case, 
inflated ratings resulted in lower rating acceptance. 
Further, the hypothesized relationships between rating 
inconsistency and rating acceptance and desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback were not supported by 
the results of Study I. Finally, the hypothesized 
relationship between rating inequity and desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback was not supported. 
Interaction Effects
In addition to the main effects in Study 1 there 
were a number of interactive effects. Significant 
interactions are presented in the following sections.
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Interaction between Inconsistency and Subject Patinas 
ANOVA results indicated significant interaction 
effects between inconsistency and inflation/deflation 
of subject rating on acceptance of rating (see Table 
3) (F(4,71) = 4.68, p < .005, omega squared = .058)
and trust in the rater (see Table 4) (F(4,71) = 3.67,
p < .05, omega squared = .074). Graphs of the 
significant interactions (Figures 3 and 4) were drawn 
to aid in their interpretation. Due to the small cell 
sizes (see Table 8), caution should be exercised when 
drawing conclusions based on these interactions. 
However, the graphs suggest that, in the Study 1 
sample, consistent ratings were associated with 
greater rating acceptance and trust in the rater than 
were inconsistent ratings except for the case where 
the ratings were deflated.
Interaction between Rating. Inconsistency, and 
Co-Workers Rating
Results of ANOVA analyses (see Tables 2 through 7) 
indicated three-way interaction effects between 
subject rating, co-worker rating, and inconsistency in 
rating for all dependent variables in the present 
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Figure 3. Subject rating X rating consistency 








Figure 4. Subject rating x rating consistency 
interaction for dependent variable: trust in
the rater.
T a ble C
Cell sizes and means for s u b j e c t  rating x i n c o n s i s t e n c y  
i n t e r a c t i o n s
l a t i n o Inconsist N
Mean
Accent S D
H e a n 
Trust in 
Rater S D
A c c . none 9 6 . 8 3 . 3 8 . 7 2 . 3
A c c . w > V 1 5 9 . 9 A . 6 13.7 3 . 1
A c c . V > W 1 0 12.3 3 . 9 1 A . A A . 6
D e f . none 1 A 19.3 1 . 1 16.8 3 . 2
D e f . V > U 1 2 15.8 2 . A 16.2 2 . 2
D e f . W > V 1 1 18.2 A . A 18.0 A . 1
Inf. none 8 13.5 A . 6 13.8 A . 6
Inf. V > w 8 16.0 5 . 0 16.5 5 . A
Inf. W » V 1 0 15.3 3 . 2 1 A . A 2 . 3
V > W = Verbal > W r i t t e n  A p p r a i s a l  
W > V = W r i t t e n  > Verbal A p p r a i s a l
-J
co
(see Table 9) and the resulting violation of the ANOVA 
homogeneity of variance assumption, these interactions 
were virtually uninterpretable. Therefore, no firm 
conclusion about the interaction among these 
independent variables can be drawn based on the 
present sample.
Interaction between Organization x Independent 
Variables
ANOVA results indicated a significant interaction 
effect between organization and co-workers ratings on 
trust in the appraisal process (F (2,55) = 3.27, p < 
.05, omega squared = .027). There were no other 
significant interactions between organization and the 
independent variables.
A graph of the resulting interaction (see Figure 
5) was drawn to aid in its interpretation. This graph 
suggested that subjects in the consulting firm had 
slightly less trust in the appraisal process than 
subjects in the insurance company when co-workers 
ratings were deflated. This difference, though 
significant, was slight (accounting for less than 3% 
of the variance in trust in the appraisal process).
T a b l e  9
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Acc. ACC. none 4 7. 0 9 . 5 12.3 8.5 10.5 11.8
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Def . inf. none 3 19.0 17.7 2 A . 3 19.0 18.3 19.3
D e f . Inf. S » W 3 18.3 16.3 19.3 16.3 15.3 14.7
Def. Inf. U » S 6 19.2 17.2 23 .3 17.7 18.0 16.8
Inf. ACC. none 4 17.8 15.8 21.5 17.8 15.8 15.8
inf. Acc. £ > W 2 18.0 1A .0 12.5 17.0 16.0 12,5
Inf. Acc, U » S 2 9 . 5 10.0 10.5 9.5 12.5 11.0
Inf. Oef . none A 9.3 11.8 18.8 9 . 8 9.5 12.8
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Figure 5. Graphic representation of the interaction 
between organization and co-worker's ratings on 
trust in the appraisal process.
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Summary. There were three significant two-way 
interactions and six significant three-way 
interactions. Due to the small cell sample size for 
the three-way interactions, these interactions were 
not meaningful. The need for this issue to be 
addressed by future research will be addressed in the 
discussion of the results.
One Wav ANOVAS
Because of the severe violation of the homogeneity 
of variance assumption for the F tests in this study 
and because the hypotheses were concerned primarily 
with main effects, one-way ANOVAS were conducted to 
verify the conclusions of Study 1. These analyses 
indicated essentially the same conclusions as the 
3x3x3 ANOVAS. There was a significant effect for 
subject rating on desire to respond to feedback (F = 
11.18, p < .0001) (H2); acceptance of rating (F =
37.05, p < .0001) (H3); and trust in the rater (F =
10.36, p < .0001), trust in the organization (F =
14.80, e  < .0001), and trust in the appraisal process
(F = 11.66, £ < -0001) (H4).
As in the initial analyses there was no main 
effect for rating inconsistency on desire to respond
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to feedback (F = .36, n.s.) nor on acceptance of 
rating (F = 2.63, n.s.) (H5; H5a). Inconsistency also
did not affect trust in the rater (F = 12.11, n.s.) or 
trust in the appraisal process (F = 1.83, n.s.) (H6;
H6a) .
Co-workers' ratings significantly affected desire 
to respond to feedback (F = 5.33, p < .01) (H7; H7a).
As with the initial analyses, co-workers' ratings 
significantly affected trust in the organization (F = 
6.84, p < .01) and trust in the appraisal process (F = 
5.33, p < .01) but not trust in the rater (F = .88, 
n.s.) (H8). Finally, there was a main effect for co­
workers' ratings on perceived appraisal system value 




The subjects for Study 2 were 95 employees in a 
large midwestern insurance company and 45 employees 
from a large northeastern financial institution. 
Subjects were selected for inclusion on the basis of 
1) having been recipients of annual or semi-annual
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formal performance reviews and 2) that they would 
continue to receive performance evaluations.
Surveys were randomly distributed to 135 
professional level (e.g., managers, district managers, 
agents) employees of the insurance company by a 
contact person. Of these, 95 were completed, yielding 
a response rate of 70.4%. The subsample from the 
insurance company consisted of 88 males and 7 females. 
Furthermore, 3% were between the ages of 20 and 29,
3 3% were between the ages of 30 and 39, 32% were 
between the ages of 40 and 49, and 32% were over the 
age of 50. Of these subjects, 18.6% had been employed 
in their present job for less than 5 years, 28.9% for 
between 5 and 10 years, and 52.6% for over 10 years.
Surveys were distributed to 80 professional level 
employees (e.g., vice presidents, loan officers, 
branch managers) in a large northeastern financial 
institution by a contact person. Of these, 45 were 
returned yielding a response rate of 56.3%. The 
financial institution subsample consisted of 24 males 
and 21 females. Furthermore, 38% were between the 
ages of 20 and 29, 31% were between the ages of 30 and 
39, 24% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and less
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than 1% were over the age of 50. Of these subjects, 
60% had been employed at their present jobs for less 
than 5 years, 20% for between 5 and 10 years, and 20% 
for over 10 years.
Therefore, the entire sample consisted of 112 
males and 28 females. Furthermore, 14% were between 
the ages of 20 and 29, 35% were between the ages of 30 
and 39, 31% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and 
23% were over the age of 50. Of these, 31% had been 
employed at their present job for less than 5 years, 
27% for between 5 and 10 years, and 42% for over 10 
years.
Procedure
A contact person in the insurance company randomly 
distributed packets of materials to the subjects (one 
per subject). This packet contained a cover letter 
(Appendix E) which explained the study to the 
participants and assured confidentiality and a list of 
possible political uses of performance appraisal 
(Appendix F). Also included in the packet was a 
questionnaire (Appendix G) assessing perceptions of 
politics in performance appraisal in the organization, 
attitudes toward performance appraisal, and desire to
81
respond to appraisal feedback. Subjects were 
instructed to mail the questionnaire directly to the 
researcher to insure confidentiality.
Instruments
Due to the lack of any suitable available existing 
measures of variables in this study, all variables 
were measured by a 49-item tailor-made survey 
instrument (Appendix G). All responses, except for 
demographic items, were measured by a 5-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Agree, 5 = Strongly 
Disagree). Descriptions of variables and sample items 
appear below.
Inflation of Ratings. The extent to which ratings 
are inflated (ratings higher than true performance) 
was assessed by a four-item scale. Items (e.g., "Due 
to organizational politics, performance ratings in my 
organization can sometimes be higher than employees 
deserve") were developed by the present author, based 
on research by Longenecker et al. (1989). Additional 
items were modified for inclusion from the Trust in 
the Appraisal Process Survey (TAPS; Bernardin, 1978).
Coefficient alpha was .82.
Deflation of Ratings. The extent to which ratings 
are deflated (ratings lower than true performance) was 
assessed by a four-item scale. Items (e.g., "Due to 
organizational politics, performance ratings in my 
organization are sometimes lower than employees 
deserve") were developed based on research by 
Longenecker et al. (1989) and modified items from the 
TAPS (Bernardin, 1978; Bernardin, Orban, & Carlyle, 
1981). Coefficient alpha was .87.
Politics in Appraisal System. Politics in the 
appraisal system was measured by a four-item 
instrument. Items (e.g., "Performance appraisal in my 
organization is influenced by politics to a great 
extent") for this subscale were designed to be 
congruent with results on politics in appraisal by 
Longenecker et al. (1987). Coefficient alpha was .89.
Equity Perceptions of Ratings. The extent to 
which subjects perceive their ratings to be equitable 
compared to their co-workers was measured by four 
items (e.g., "My performance is evaluated as fairly as 
the performance of my co-workers"). This scale used 
some items which were adapted from scales on ratee 
attitudes toward performance appraisal by Platz (1985)
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and by Bernardin et al. (1981). Coefficient alpha was 
.88.
Consistency of Feedback. The extent to which 
performance appraisals are consistent with verbal 
feedback from supervisors was measured by a four-item 
scale. Items (e.g., "Verbal feedback from my 
supervisor corresponds to my written performance 
evaluation") for this scale were developed to be 
congruent with research findings by Longenecker (1989) 
which indicated that politics in appraisal can 
precipitate inconsistency between written and spoken 
feedback. Coefficient alpha was .83.
Acceptance of Feedback. The extent to which 
subjects accept their ratings as accurate indicators 
of their performance was measured by five items (e.g., 
"Based on what I contribute to my organization, I am 
accurately appraised"). This scale uses some items 
adapted from the TAPS scale on ratee perceptions of 
the appraisal process by Bernardin et al. (1981). 
Additional items were adapted for use from scales on 
ratee attitudes to performance feedback by Landy et
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al. (1978) and Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981). 
Coefficient alpha was .84.
Trust in the Organization. Subjects' trust in 
their organization was assessed by four items (e.g.,
"I trust my organization to act in my best interest"). 
Items were written to be similar to those addressing 
trust in the organization from various scales of job 
involvement, organizational commitment, and 
organizational climate which appear in Cook,
Hepworth, Wall, and Warr (1981). Coefficient alpha 
was .88.
Trust in the Appraisal Process. Subjects' trust 
in their organization's appraisal process was measured 
by four items (e.g., "The performance appraisal 
process in my organization can be trusted"). Items 
were adapted for inclusion from a measure of fairness 
by Folger and Konovsky (1989). Additional items 
tapping trust in the appraisal process were included 
which were similar to those from various items tapping 
job involvement, organizational commitment, and 
organizational climate which appear in Cook et al. 
(1981). Coefficient alpha was .89.
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Trust in the Rater. Subjects* trust in their 
supervisor was measured by four items (e.g., "I trust 
my supervisor"). Some items for this scale were 
adapted for inclusion from a measure of fairness by 
Folger and Konovsky (1989). Additional items were 
included which were written to be congruent with 
those tapping rater trust from various sub-scales of 
job involvement measures which appear in Cook et al. 
(1981). Coefficient alpha was .92.
Desire to Respond to Appraisal Feedback.
Subjects' desire to respond to appraisal feedback was 
measured using a scale designed in part from items on 
various job involvement scales dealing with desire to 
respond to feedback and appearing in Cook et al.
(1981). Additional items were adapted from a scale on 
ratee intentions to improve performance by Platz 
(1985). Subjects' agreement with each of the four 
items (e.g., "My performance appraisal makes me feel 
motivated to perform effectively") was measured by a 
five-point Likert-type scale. Coefficient alpha 
was .85.
Value of the Appraisal System. Subj ects' 
perceptions of the value of their organization's
performance appraisal system were measured by a four 
items (e.g., "The performance appraisal system in my 
organization is a worthwhile use of resources").
Some items from a measure of employee reactions to 
appraisal systems by Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981) 
were adapted for inclusion. Additional items were 
written to be similar to items addressing performance 
appraisal value from various scales dealing with job 
involvement, organizational commitment, and 
organizational climate which appear in Cook et 
al. (1981). Coefficient alpha was .81.
Demographics. Subjects' sex, age, years of 
employment, and years of employment at their present 
job were measured by four items. These items were 
placed at the end of the survey due to research by 
Roberson and Sundstrom (1990) which suggested that 
subjects may be more likely to complete and return 
questionnaires when demographic items appear at the 
end of the instrument.
Analysis
Correlational analysis was utilized in testing the 
hypotheses of Study 2 concerning employee attitudes 
and desire to respond to feedback.
Results
Subgroup Analyses
Two-group tests of mean differences (2-tailed t) 
were conducted to determine if subjects differed in 
their responses depending on their organization. 
Results of these tests (see Table 10) indicated that 
there were no significant mean differences between 
groups on any political variables measured in this 
study. Therefore, all subjects were analyzed as one 
sample for the purposes of hypothesis testing.
As previously discussed, Study 2 measured 11 vari­
ables related to perceptions of and reactions to 
political use of performance appraisal. Table 11 
presents descriptive statistics and variable 
intercorrelations. The correlation matrix contains 
the information necessary to address the hypotheses.
Perception of politics in appraisal. Hypothesis 1 
predicted that perceived use of politics in the 
appraisal process would be negatively associated with 
perceived appraisal system value. Analyses indicated 
a significant negative relationship between perceived 
use of politics in appraisal and perceived appraisal
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system value (r = -.40, e  < .0001), supporting 
Hypothesis l.
Perception of inflation of ratings. Hypothesis 2 
predicted that perceived politically motivated 
inflation of ratings would not be associated with 
desire to respond to feedback. Analyses indicated a 
significant negative relationship between perceived 
inflation of ratings and desire to respond to feedback 
(r = -.236, e  < .05), failing to support Hypothesis 2.
Perception of deflation of ratings. Hypothesis 3 
predicted that perceived politically motivated 
deflation of ratings would be negatively associated 
with rating acceptance. Analyses indicated a 
significant negative relationship between perceived 
deflation and acceptance of rating (r = -.77, e  < 
.0001), supporting Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that perceived politically 
motivated deflation of ratings would be negatively 
associated with trust in the rater, trust in the 
organization, and trust in the appraisal process. 
Analyses indicated significant negative relationships 
between perceived deflation and: Trust in the rater
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(r = -.59, e < .0001), trust in the organization (r = 
-.44, e < .0001), and trust in appraisal process (r = 
-.61, p < .0001), supporting Hypothesis 4.
Perception of inconsistency in ratings.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that perceived politically 
motivated inconsistency between written and spoken 
appraisal would be negatively associated with rating 
acceptance and desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback. Analyses indicated significant negative 
relationships between perceived inconsistency and both 
rating acceptance (r = -.71, e  < .0001) and desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback (r = -.67, e  < -0001) , 
supporting Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that perceived politically 
motivated inconsistency between written and spoken 
appraisal would be negatively associated with trust in 
the rater and trust in the appraisal process.
Analyses indicated significant negative relationships 
between perceived inconsistency and both, trust in the 
rater (r = -.62, e < .0001), and trust in the 
appraisal process (r = -.62, e < .0001), supporting 
Hypothesis 6.
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Perception of inequity in ratings. Hypothesis 7 
predicted that perceived inequity in ratings would be 
negatively associated with desire to respond to 
appraisal feedback. Analyses indicated a significant 
negative relationship between perceived inequity and 
desire to respond to feedback (r = -.56, p < .0001), 
supporting Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that perceived inequity in 
ratings would be negatively associated with trust in 
the rater, trust in the appraisal process, and trust 
in the organization. Analyses indicated significant 
negative relationships between perceived inequity and 
trust in the rater (r = -.58, p < .0001), trust in the 
appraisal process (r = -.71, p < .0001), and trust in 
the organization (r = -.54, p < .0001), supporting 
Hypothesis 8.
Hypothesis 9 predicted that perceived inequity in 
rating would be negatively associated with perceived 
appraisal system value. Analyses indicated a 
significant negative relationship between these 




In summary, the analyses provided support for 
Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. In general, 
perceptions of politics in appraisal and politically 
motivated use of appraisals (inflation, deflation, 
inequity in rating, inconsistent ratings) were 
associated with negative employee attitudes and lower 
acceptance of, and desire to respond to, appraisal 
feedback. No support was found for Hypothesis 2. 
Subjects' perceptions of rating inflation were 
negatively associated with rating acceptance. 
Exploratory Analyses
After testing the hypotheses proposed in the 
present study, additional relationships among the 
variables were investigated.
Political Variables
As shown in Table 11, the variables measuring 
perceptions of politics, inflation, deflation, 
inequity, and inconsistency in appraisal all were 
significantly and positively related to each other. 
Significant non-hypothesized correlations between 
these variables and employee attitudes and acceptance
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of, and desire to respond to, feedback are presented 
in the following sections.
Politics in appraisal. Perceptions of politics in 
appraisal were also significantly negatively 
associated with rating acceptance (r = -.54, p < 
.0001), trust in the organization (r = -.53, p < 
.0001), trust in the rater (r = -.55, p < .0001), 
trust in the appraisal process (r = -.67, p < .0001), 
and desire to respond to appraisal feedback (r = -.44,
p < .0001).
Inflation of ratings. Perceptions of inflation of 
ratings were also significantly negatively associated 
with rating acceptance (r = -.23, p < .05), trust in 
the organization (r = -.26, p < .05), trust in the 
rater (r = -.21, p < .05), trust in the appraisal 
process (r = -.30, p < .0001), and perceived appraisal 
system value (r = -.23, p < .0001) .
Deflation of ratings. Perceived deflation of 
ratings was also significantly negatively associated 
with desire to respond to feedback (r = -.59, p < 
.0001) and perceived appraisal system value (r = -.45,
p < .0001).
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Inequity in ratings. Inequity perceptions were 
also significantly negatively associated with rating 
acceptance (r = -.65, p < .0001).
Inconsistency in ratings. Perceptions of 
inconsistency were also significantly negatively 
associated with trust in the organization (r = -.43, p 
< .0001) and perceived appraisal system value (r = 
-.57, p < .0001).
Additional Analyses
Regression procedures were used to investigate the 
relationships between the variables identified in the 
tentative model of politics in performance appraisal 
(see Figure 2). Based on this model, the variables 
inflation, deflation and inconsistency of ratings were 
combined to yield a measure of personal experience 
with politics. A measure of psychological processes 
was developed by combining the variables perceived 
equity, acceptance of rating, and trust (in the rater, 
the organization, and the appraisal process). While 
the high intercorrelations between variables allowed 
for these combinations (see Table 11), it is 
acknowledged that this is but one of several 
combinations that could be justified empirically.
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Results of analyses using the aforementioned combined 
variables indicated that perception of politics in 
appraisal significantly predicted perceived value of 
appraisal system (B = .42, r2 = .154, t = -5.11, p < 
.0001) and desire to respond to appraisal feedback (B 
= -.44, rf = .189, t = -5.75, p < .0001). Figure 6 
presents the model of politics in performance 
appraisal with regression coefficients added.
However, perception of politics was a stronger 
predictor of psychological process variables (see 
Figure 6). Perception of politics significantly 
predicted psychological process variables (b =
-.713, r2 = .505, t = -11.92, p < .0001).
Additionally, psychological process variables 
significantly predicted perceived appraisal system 
value (b = .67, = .443, t = 10.57, p < .0001).
Perception of politics predicted 47% of the 
variance in personal experience with politics (B =
.69, r£ = .466, t = 10.32, p < .0001). Personal 
experience with politics and general perception of 
politics together predicted 61% of the variance in 
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Tentative model of the effects of politics in 
performance appraisal with regression coeffi­
cients added.
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Perception of politics, personal experience with 
politics, and psychological processes predicted 49% of 
the variance in perceived appraisal value (Rf = .492,
P  < .0001). However, psychological processes was the 
only significant predictor when entered first in the 
equation (B = .744, t = 7.13, p < .0001). These 
variables predicted 54% of the variance in desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback (R^ = .535, p < .0001). 
Stepwise regression analyses indicated that combined 
psychological processes was the strongest predictor (B 
= .63, t = 6.32, p < .0001), however, personal 
experience with politics also was a significant 
predictor (B = -.29, t = -3.07, p < .05). Perception 
of politics was not a significant predictor in this 
equation.
While the purpose of this study was not model 
testing, the tentative model (Figure 6), with 
regression coefficients added, helps to illustrate the 
findings of this study. It can be seen that 
psychological processes strongly predict both 
perceived appraisal system value and desire to respond 
to appraisal feedback. Psychological processes are,
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in turn, strongly predicted by general perceptions of 
politics and personal experience with politics. 
However, the analyses do not allow directional or 
causal inferences to be made from these results.
Summary
In summary, hypothesized and non-hypothesized 
results indicated several major themes. First, 
variables measuring perceptions of politics in 
appraisal were all positively associcated with each 
other. Second, variables measuring employee attitudes 
and acceptance/desire to respond to feedback 
(hypothesized "reactions” to politics) were all 
positively associated with each other. Further, all 
of the political variables were negatively associated 
with each attitude and acceptance/desire to respond 
variable. Finally, regression analyses indicated that 
combined psychological processes was the strongest 
predictor of perceived appraisal system value and 
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.
Discussion
This section will discuss results of the present 
research. An overview of the findings regarding the 
hypothesized relationships between politics in 
performance appraisal and ratee attitudes, acceptance 
of rating, and desire to respond to appraisal feedback 
will first be presented. A discussion of additional 
exploratory analyses will follow. Next, limitations 
of the present research and theoretical and applied 
implications will be discussed. Finally, some 
directions for future research in the area will 
be presented.
Results of Analyses of Hypothesized Relationships
Hypothesis 1, which predicted that politics in the 
appraisal process would be positively associated with 
perceived value of the appraisal system, was supported 
by the results of Study 2. This result is consistent 
with research on source credibility (Ilgen et al., 
1979; Earley, 1986) which suggests that source 
credibility is an important determinant of ratee 
reactions to performance feedback.
Results of analyses in both Study 1 and Study 2 
failed to support Hypothesis 2 which proposed that
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there would be no relationship between inflation of 
ratings and ratee desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback. This was hypothesized due to prior research 
which suggested that positive feedback would be 
readily accepted (Ilgen et al., 1979) and studies 
which suggested that ratees have a high tolerance for 
positive inequity (Greenberg, 1983). Together, these 
bodies of research led to the inference that inflated 
ratings would suggest that there is no need for 
improved performance. Analyses in both studies 
indicated that there was a significant negative 
relationship between rating inflation and desire to 
respond to feedback. Research by Longenecker et al.
(1987) suggested that raters may inflate ratings to 
influence ratee behavior (e.g., motivate ratees) and 
attitudes. The results of the present research, while 
not supporting Hypothesis 2, suggest that raters' 
inflation of performance appraisals may not have the 
intended positive effects on ratees. Further, the 
effect of inflation may be actually to de-motivate 
ratees. It is possible that subjects in feedback and 
equity research did not know that they were receiving 
positive/inequitable feedback. Subjects in the
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present research were asked explicitly if they 
received inflated ratings. This issue is discussed 
further as a limitation of the present research.
Analyses from both Study 1 and Study 2 supported 
Hypothesis 3 which predicted that ratings deflated for 
political reasons would be negatively associated with 
rating acceptance. These results are consistent with 
research on feedback sign (Landy & Farr, 1983) and 
suggest that negative feedback is less accepted than 
positive feedback. Additionally, these results are 
consistent with equity theory tenets (Carrell & 
Dittrich, 1978) that posit that individuals have very 
low tolerance of negative inequity (inputs greater 
than outcomes).
Hypothesis 4 proposed that politically motivated 
deflation of ratings would be negatively associated 
with trust in the rater, trust in the organization, 
and trust in the appraisal process. This hypothesis 
was supported by both Study 1 (vignettes) and Study 2 
(survey). These results are generally consistent with 
research on feedback message (Ilgen et al., 1979) and 
suggest that deflated ratings are associated with 
negative employee reactions to feedback. Further, it
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is consistent with research by Pearce and Porter 
(1986) which suggested that negative feedback is 
associated with negative employee attitudes.
Hypothesis 5 proposed that politically motivated 
inconsistency between written and spoken performance 
appraisal would be negatively associated with rating 
acceptance and ratee desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback. Results of Study 1 indicated that 
inconsistency was negatively associated with 
rating acceptance but not with desire to respond to 
appraisal feedback. Analyses in Study 2 supported 
Hypothesis 5 for both acceptance of rating and desire 
to respond to appraisal feedback. The relationship 
between inconsistency in verbal versus written 
appraisal is consistent with prior research (Stone & 
Stone, 1985), and suggests that feedback consistency 
is an important component of feedback acceptance. 
Significant results in Study 2 for desire to respond 
to feedback give some support to the contentions of 
Longenecker and Gioia (1988) that inconsistency 
between written and spoken feedback is associated with 
negative outcomes.
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Hypothesis 5a attempted to test the specific form 
of inconsistency between written and verbal 
performance appraisal. It was hypothesized that 
ratees whose verbal feedback was more positive than 
their written appraisal would have lower desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback versus ratees whose 
written feedback was more positive than their verbal 
feedback. There was no support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that inconsistency in 
appraisal feedback would be negatively associated with 
trust in the rater and trust in the appraisal process. 
This hypothesis was not supported by results from 
Study 1. However, results from Study 2 supported 
this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6a (tested only in Study 1), predicted 
that subjects receiving verbal feedback which was more 
positive than their written feedback would have lower 
trust in the rater and lower trust in the appraisal 
process. There was no support for this hypothesis.
Taken together, the results of tests of hypotheses 
5 and 6 give some support to anecdotal evidence 
reported by Longenecker and Gioia (1988) that 
inconsistency between verbal and written appraisal
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feedback is associated with negative ratee attitudes 
and outcomes.
Hypothesis 7 predicted that inequity in appraisals 
would be negatively associated with ratee desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback. This hypothesis was 
supported by the results of Study 2. Ratees who 
perceived that inequity existed in the appraisal 
process had lower desire to respond to appraisal 
feedback. The results of Study 2 analyses were 
consistent with equity theory predictions (Adams,
1965) that felt inequity may lead to 
reduced motivation.
Hypothesis 7a attempted to test a specific form of 
inequity in appraisal. It was hypothesized that 
ratees who received accurate or deflated ratings would 
have lower desire to respond to appraisal feedback 
when their co-workers received inflated ratings.
There was no support for this hypothesis, which was 
tested only in Study 1.
Hypothesis 8, which predicted that inequity in 
performance appraisal would be negatively associated 
with trust in the rater, trust in the appraisal 
process, and trust in the organization, was partially
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supported by the results from Study 1. Inequity was 
negatively associated with trust in the appraisal 
process; however, there was no effect of inequity on 
trust in the rater. Further, trust in the 
organization was lower only when subjects' co-workers 
received inflated ratings. Hypothesis 8 was fully 
supported for trust in the rater, organization, and 
appraisal process by the results from Study 2.
Hypothesis 9 predicted that inequity in 
performance appraisal would be negatively associated 
with perceived value of the appraisal system. This 
hypothesis was partially supported by the results of 
Study 1. Perceived value of the appraisal system was 
greater in subjects whose co-workers received inflated 
or deflated ratings (versus subjects whose co-workers 
received accurate ratings). Additional analyses from 
Study 2 also found a non-hypothesized negative 
relationship between perceived inequity and perceived 
value of the appraisal system. The significant 
results from Study 1 and Study 2 are consistent with 
equity theory (e.g, Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1982; Lane 
& Messe', 1972) and suggest that felt inequity is 
associated with negative attitudes in ratees.
107
Exploratory Analyses
Study 1. Additional analyses from Study 1 
indicated that acceptance of rating and trust in the 
rater were significantly affected by the interaction 
between subject ratings and inconsistency in ratings. 
As mentioned previously, the small cell sizes (see 
Table 8) made the nature of the interactions difficult 
to interpret. However, the graphs of these 
interactions suggest that consistent ratings are not 
associated with rating acceptance and trust in the 
rater when ratings are deflated.
Study 2. Additional correlational analyses 
indicated three major results (see Table 11). First, 
political appraisal variables were all significantly 
positively correlated with each other. Second, all 
reaction variables (trust, acceptance, desire to 
respond) were all significantly positively correlated 
with each other. Finally, all political appraisal 
variables were significantly negatively correlated 
with each reaction variable in this study.
These results suggest that there is a strong 
association between different aspects of politics in 
appraisal and employee reaction variables. The
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results of the exploratory analyses give further 
support to the thesis that political use of appraisal 
is associated with negative outcomes.
Integrative Overview Study 1/Study 2
Results of analyses of Study 1 and Study 2 
followed essentially the same pattern. Perceived 
political use of performance appraisals was strongly 
associated with negative outcomes in both studies. 
Correlational analyses in Study 2 were consistent with 
ANOVA results in Study 1. This suggests that 
political perception variables may lead to ratee 
outcomes rather than vice-versa (see Figure 5). While 
the results of correlational and regression analyses 
(Study 2) do not allow for causal or directional 
statements to be made, the research design of Study 1 
suggests a possible causal link.
In the two cases where results of Studies 1 and 2 
were not consistent (H5, H7), the hypotheses were 
supported by the field survey and not the political 
manipulation vignette study. In these cases, however, 
mean differences in the Study 1 sample were in the 
predicted directions. While this cannot be 
interpreted as any kind of support for the unsupported
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hypotheses, it does suggest that the opposite 
relationships did not exist in this sample.
A fifth limitation was the overrepresentation of 
males in the study and the elimination of lower level 
employees. The generalizability of the study is 
therefore limited to males in higher level jobs. The 
implications of this for future research are addressed 
in the final section of the discussion.
Finally, the lack of association between 
organization studied (with the exception of one 
variable in Study 1) and outcome measures, suggests, 
at least in the present samples, subjects' 
organization does not moderate perceptions of and 
reaction to political variables. This result is 
consistent with the thesis that reaction to politics 
is an individual rather than an 
organizational variable.
Limitations/Alternative Explanations of Results
Several limitations of the present research should 
be noted. First, the present study used only 
self-report questionnaires to measure all dependent 
variables. Previous research has shown that using a 
single type of measurement strategy may bias observed
110
results (Williams, Cote, & Buckley, 1989). It is 
possible that the nature of the instruments or wording 
of the items could have biased the results. Related 
to this, the vignette manipulation and self-report 
measures of inflation/deflation of ratings may have 
over-stated the phenomenon (e.g., ratees in 
organizations may not know when they have received 
inflated/deflated ratings) .
The second limitation involves the vignette 
manipulations in Study 1. Although actual ratees in 
two organizations were used for this study, the 
results were based on reactions to hypothetical 
ratings and situations. As performance appraisal is a 
significant event for ratees, it may be the case that 
ratees would have reacted differently if they had 
actually received the ratings in the organizational 
conditions described. However, this limitation is 
probably minor due to the observed consistency 
between studies.
A third limitation involves the tailor-made 
instruments used to measure the variables. Although 
all measures demonstrated acceptable reliability, 
there was a high degree of intercorrelation among
Ill
variables. It is possible that the variables were 
contaminated and do not have a high degree of 
discriminant validity.
A fourth limitation concerns the analysis of the 
Study 2 results. Although the research design of 
Study 1 allows the suggestion of causal relationships, 
the only study to assess existing organizational 
politics, Study 2, was analyzed by correlational 
techniques. Correlational analysis only demonstrates 
degree of association between variables and does not 
allow for causal or directional statements to be made 
regarding the obtained relationships. However, the 
overlap and consistency between Studies 1 and 2 serves 
to limit the impact of this limitation to a 
certain extent.
A final limitation concerns the small, uneven cell 
sizes for testing interactions in Study 1. Although 
significant three-way interactions resulted, the small 
cell sizes renders these results interpretable. As 
the present study hypothesize only main effects, 
future research should be conducted with even cell 
sizes of sufficient size for finding and interpreting 
interactions among political appraisal variables.
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Applications
The results of the present study have implications 
for both theory and application in performance 
appraisal. Longenecker et al. (1987) demonstrated 
that raters may, rather than striving for accuracy, 
use performance appraisal as a political tool to 
influence outcomes and ratee behavior. The present 
study was an attempt to discover the effects of these 
political biases in performance appraisal on ratee 
attitudes, acceptance of feedback, and desire to 
respond to feedback. Results of the present research 
suggest that political use of appraisal (e.g., 
inflation, deflation, inconsistency, inequity) is 
associated with several negative outcomes including 
lower trust, lower feedback acceptance, lower belief 
in value of appraisal process, and lower desire to 
respond to appraisal feedback.
With regard to applied significance, the present 
study identified several negative outcomes that were 
associated with political bias in appraisal. Raters 
who bias ratings, using the performance appraisal as a 
political tool, should realize that political use of 
appraisal and political bias in appraisal may lead to
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lower trust in them as raters and lower trust in the 
organization and the appraisal process. The present 
research suggests that raters should use the appraisal 
process as a means to communicate perceived employee 
performance in an unbiased manner. Raters should 
attempt to avoid the perception of inequitable or 
biased ratings in order to minimize employee distrust 
and negative attitudes toward the appraisal process.
Inconsistency between written and spoken feedback 
was associated with negative attitudes and reduced 
desire to respond to appraisal feedback. Raters need 
to realize that inconsistency, and political use of 
appraisals in general, may be detrimental to 
organizational functioning. Written and verbal 
ratings should be as consistent with each other as 
possible. All attempts should be made to avoid 
allowing political conditions (e.g., scarcity of 
funds, personal agendas) to artificially inflate or 
deflate written or verbal feedback.
The present study suggests the need for the 
development of rater training programs which 
incorporate the effects of political bias in appraisal 
and teach methods of reducing/managing politics in
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appraisal (see Longenecker & Gioia, 1988). The 
present study suggests that these programs should 
include a summary of the negative impact of distorted 
or biased ratings. Additionally, potential biases in 
ratings and methods for dealing with these should be 
covered. While rater training programs cannot assure 
unbiased ratings or employee acceptance of ratings, 
they can illustrate the importance of limiting 
political use of appraisal. Politics most likely 
cannot be totally eliminated. However, its 
detrimental impact can be minimized through these 
types of programs.
The theoretical significance of this research is 
two-fold. First, the present research extended the 
body of research on rater motivation (Zedeck & Cascio, 
1891) and politics in appraisal (Longenecker et al., 
1987) by studying the effects of political bias on 
ratees. Secondly, the present research used both 
feedback process research (Ilgen et al., 1979) and 
equity theory findings (Greenberg, 1983) to develop 
hypotheses regarding the effects of political bias. 
This previous research, along with results of the 
present study, can be used as a first step in
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developing a model of the effects of politics in 
performance appraisal. Regression analyses (see 
Figure 5) suggest that this tentative model is a 
possible representation of how politics operates in 
performance appraisal. It should be noted, however, 
that, due to high variable intercorrelations and the 
limitations of correlational techniques, other 
representations of the results may be better models of 
politics in appraisal.
Finally, this research, along with research by 
Longenecker et al. (1987), is a step toward narrowing 
the research-practice gap identified by Banks and 
Murphy (1985) and putting to rest the implicit 
assumption that accuracy is the primary goal of raters 
completing performance appraisal documents 
in organizations.
Future Research
While the present study provides some support for 
the negative effects of political bias in appraisal, 
several aspects of the area remain in need of further 
study. First, the effects of political bias need to 
be replicated and extended in other samples. Related 
to this, research identifying the pervasiveness of
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politics and the degree of politics in organizations 
would be beneficial in understanding the phenomenon 
and developing programs and interventions to control 
and manage politics. This research would have 
significant implications for performance 
appraisal practitioners.
Secondly, testing of a model which incorporates 
politics and the use of performance appraisal as a 
tool could be undertaken (see Figure 5). The 
collection of data over time and the use of techniques 
(e.g., LISREL) which would allow causal inferences to 
be drawn would further research in this area. 
Additionally, the relationship of politics to 
variables not tested (e.g., motivation, performance, 
organization commitment, turnover) should be included 
in future models.
Third, future researchers should refine and 
develop measures of politics and measures of the 
effects of politics in performance appraisal. The 
high intercorrelations among variables in the present 
study suggest that better measures may need to be 
developed and/or variables need to 
be reconceptualized.
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Fourth, future research should further investigate 
possible interactive effects of political variables in 
appraisal. The present study was not able to 
adequately interpret interactions due to small 
cell sizes.
Fifth, the present research did not address the 
issue of politically motivated lack of appraisal.
This has been suggested as a major area of concern, 
especially for executives (Longenecker & Gioia, 1988). 
Future research should address this potentially 
important issue.
Finally, results of the effects of politically 
motivated inconsistency were mixed in the present 
study. Future research should investigate how 
inconsistency between written and verbal feedback 
impacts ratees.
Conclusion
In conclusion, past research has shown that raters 
use performance appraisals as political tools in 
attempts to achieve personal and organizational goals 
(Longenecker et al., 1987). The present research 
suggests that politically motivated distortions of 
ratings impact ratees in several negative ways.
Politics in appraisal is related to lower trust, 
acceptance of feedback, belief in appraisal system 
value and desire to respond to appraisal feedback. 
Further, the results suggest that any intended 
benefits of political use of appraisal may be 
outweighed by the negative impact on ratees.
Therefore, findings from the present study suggest 
that raters need to be aware of the effects of 
political use of appraisal and strive to give honest, 
accurate feedback. Research in the area of rater 
training programs which acknowledge politics in 
appraisal will help in this regard, and further reduce 
the research-practice gap in performance appraisal.
References
Adams, J.S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In 
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental 
social psychology fVol 2. p p . 267-299). New York: 
Academic Press.
Ashford, S.J. (1986). Feedback-seeking in individual 
adaptation: A resource perspective. Academy of
Management Journal. 29, 465-487.
Ashford, S.J., & Cummings, L.L. (1983). Feedback as an 
individual resource: Personal strategies of
creating information. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance. 32, 370—398.
Banks, C.G., & Murphy, K.R. (1985). Toward narrowing 
the research-practice gap in performance 
appraisal. Personnel Psychology. 38. 335-345.
Bannister, B.D. (1986). Performance outcome feedback 
and attributional feedback: Interactive effects
on recipient responses. Journal of Applied 
Psychology. 71. 203-210.
Becker, T.E., & Klimoski, R.J. (1989). A field study 
of the relationship between the organizational 
feedback environment and performance. Personnel 
Psychology. 42. 343-358.
Bernardin, H.J. (1978). The development and use of the 
trust in the appraisal process survey (TAPS). 
Unpublished manuscript.
Bernardin, H.J., & Beatty, R.W. (1984). Performance 
appraisal: Assessing human behavior at work.
Boston: Kent.
Bernardin, H.J., Orban, J.A., & Carlyle, J.J. (1981). 
Performance rating as a function of trust in 
appraisal and rater individual differences. 
Proceedings of the Academy of Management. 311-315.
119
120
Bernardin, H.J., & Orban, J.A. (1984). Leniency effect 
as a function of rating format, purpose for 
appraisal and rater individual differences. Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Academy 
of Management.
Bernardin, H.J., & Villanova, P. (1986). Performance 
appraisal. In E. Locke (Ed.), Generalizing from 
laboratory to field settings. Lexington, MA:
D.C. Heath.
Campbell, J.P., Dunnette, M.D., Lawler, E.E., & Weick, 
K.E. (1970). Managerial behavior, performance, 
and effectiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Cardy, R.L., & Dobbins, G.H. (1986). Affect and 
appraisal accuracy: Liking as an integral
dimension in evaluating performance. Journal of 
Applied Psychology. 71. 672-678.
Carrell, M.R., & Dittrich, J.E. (1978). Equity theory: 
the recent literature, methodological 
considerations and new directions. Academy of 
Management Review. 3, 202-210.
Carroll, S.J., & Schneier, C.E. (1982). Performance
appraisal and review systems: The identification,
measurement, and development of performance in 
organizations. Glenview, IL: Scott-Forseman.
Cleveland, J.N., Murphy, & K.R., Williams, R.E. (1989). 
Multiple uses of performance appraisal:
Prevalance and correlates. Journal of Applied 
Psychology. 74. 130-135.
Coleman, L., Jussim, L., & Abraham, J. (1987).
Students' reactions to teachers' evaluations: The
unique impact of negative feedback. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology. 17. 1051-1070.
Cook, J.D., Hepworth, S.J., Wall, T.D., & Warr, P.B. 
(1981). The experience of work. London:
Academic Press.
121
Dipboye, R.L. , & de Pontbriand, R. (1981). Correlates 
of employee reactions to performance appraisals 
and appraisal systems. Journal of Applied 
Psychology. 66, 248-251.
Earley, P.C. (1986). Trust, perceived importance of 
praise and criticism, and work performance: An
examination of feedback in the United States and 
England. Journal of Management. 12, 457-453.
Feldman, J. (1981). Beyond attribution theory:
Cognitive processes in performance evaluation. 
Journal of Applied Psychology. 66., 127-148.
Fisher, C. D. (1989). Current and recurrent challenges 
in HRM. Journal of Management. 15. 157-180.
Florin-Thuma, B.C., & Boudreau, J.W. (1987).
Performance feedback utility in a small 
organization: Effects on organizational outcomes
and managerial decision processes. Personnel 
Psychology. 40, 693-713.
Folger, R., & Konovsky, M.A. (1989). Effects of
procedural and distributive justice on reactions 
to pay raise decisions. Academy of Management 
Journal. 32. 115-130.
Ford, J.K., MacCallum, R.C., & Tait, M. (1986). The 
application of exporatory factor analysis in 
applied psychology: A critical review and
analysis. Personnel Psychology. 39, 291-314.
Greenberg, J. (1982). Approaching equity and avoiding 
inequity in groups and organizations. In J. 
Greenberg & R.L. Cohen (Eds.), Eouitv and justice 
in social behavior (p p . 389-435). New York: 
Academic Press.
Greenberg, J. (1986). Determinants of perceived
fairness of performance evaluations. Journal of 
Applied Psychology. 71, 340-342.
122
Greenhaus, J.H., Seidel, C., & Marinis, M. (1983). The 
impact of expectations and values on job 
attitudes. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Peformance. 31. 394-417.
Guzzo, R.A., Jette, R.D., & Katzell, R.A. (1985). The 
effects of psychologically based intervention 
programs on worker productivity: A meta-analysis.
Personnel Psychology. 38. 275-291.
Heneman, R.L. (1988). The relationship between
supervisory ratings and results-oriented measures 
of performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel
Psychology. 39. 811-826.
Ilgen, D.R., Fisher, C.D., & Taylor, M.S. (1979).
Consequences of individual feedback on behavior in 
organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology. 64. 
349-371.
Ilgen, D.R., & Favero, J.L. (1985). Limits in
generalization from psychological research to 
performance appraisal processes. Academy of 
Managment Review. 10. 311-321.
Ilgen, &, Moore, C.F. (1987). Types and choices of 
performance feedback. Journal of Applied 
Psychology. 72, 401-406.
Kanuk, L. & Berenson, C. (1975). Mail Surveys and
response rates: A literature review. Journal of
Marketing Research. 12., 440-453.
Kirk, R.E. (1982) Experimental design: Procedures for
the behavioral sciences. 12 ed.l. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole.
Kopelman, R.E. (1986). Objective feedback. In E.A.
Locke (Ed.) Generalizing from laboratory to field 
settings (pp. 119-145). Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books.
123
Landy, F.J., Barnes-Farrell, J., & Cleveland, J.N.
(1980). Perceived fairness and accuracy of 
performance evaluation: A follow-up. Journal of
Applied Psychology. 65, 355-356.
Landy, F.J., Barnes, J.L., & Murphy, K.R. (1978).
Correlates of perceived fairness and accuracy of 
performance evaluation. Journal of Applied 
Psychology. 63. 751-754.
Landy, F.J., & Farr, J.L., & Jacobs, R.H. (1982). 
Utility concepts in performance measurement. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. 30. 
15-40.
Landy, F.J., & Farr, J.L. (1983). The measurement of 
work performance. New York: Academic Press.
Lane, I.M., & Messe', L.A. (1972). Distribution of 
insufficient, sufficient, and oversufficient 
rewards: A clarification of equity theory.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 21, 
228-233.
Larson, J.R. (1986). Supervisors' performance feedback 
to subordinates: The impact of subordinate'
performance valence and outcome dependence. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes. 37. 391-408.
Larson, J.R. (1989). The dynamic interplay between 
employees' feedback seeking strategies and 
supervisors' delivery of performance feedback. 
Academy of Management Review. 14. 408-422.
Latham, G.P., & Wexley, K.N. (1981). Increasing 
performance through performance appraisal.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Latham, G.P., & Yukl, G.A. (1975). A review of
research on the application of goal setting in 
organizations. Academy of Management Journal. 18, 
824-845.
124
Levine, E.L. (1980). Introductory remarks for the 
symposium "Organizational applications of 
self-appraisal and self-assessment: Another
look." Personnel Psychology. 33., 259-262.
Locher, A.H., & Teel, K.S. (1983). Appraisal trends. 
Personnel Journal. September. 139-145.
Locke, E.A. (1968). Toward a theory of task motives 
and incentives. Organization Behavior and Human 
Performance. 3., 157-189.
Locke, E.A., Shaw, K.N. , Saari, L.M. , & Latham, G.P.
(1981). Goal setting and task performance, 
1969-1980. Psychological Bulletin, 90, 125-152.
Longenecker, C.O. (1991) The political dimensions of 
executive performance evaluations. Paper 
presented at the sixth annual meeting of the 
Society for Industrial Organizational 
Psychology; St. Louis.
Longenecker, C.O. (1989). Truth or consequences: 
Politics and performance appraisal. Business 
Horizons. 32., 1-7.
Longenecker, C.O., & Gioia, D.A. (1988). Neglected at 
the top: Executives talk about executive
appraisal. Sloan Management Review. Winter. 
41-47.
Longenecker, C.O., Liverpool, P.R., & Wilson, K.A.
(1988). An assessment of managerial/subordinate 
perceptions of performance appraisal 
effectiveness. Journal of Business and 
Psychology. 2, 311-320.
Longenecker, C.O., & Ludwig, D. (1990). Ethical 
dilemmas in performance appraisal revisited. 
Journal of Business Ethics.
Longenecker, C.O., Sims, H.P., & Gioia, D.A. (1987). 
Behind the mask: The politics of performance
appraisal. Academy of Management Executive. 1, 
183-193.
125
McCarty, P.A. (1986). Effects of feedback on the 
self-confidence of men and women. Academy of 
Management Review. 29. 840-847.
McEvoy, G.M., & Buller, P.F. (1987). User acceptance 
of peer appraisals in an industrial setting.
Personne1 Psvcholoav. 40, 785-797.
McIntyre, R.M., Smith, D.E., & Hassett, C.E. (1984). 
Accuracy of performance ratings as affected by 
rater training and perceived purpose of rating. 
Journal of Applied Psychology. 69, 147-156.
Mohrmann, A., & Lawler, E. (1983). Motivation and 
performance appraisal behavior. In F. Landy 
(Ed.), Performance measurement; Directions for 
the future. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mohrmann, A.M., Resnick-West, S.M., & Lawler, E.E.
(1989). Designing Performance Appraisal Systems; 
Aligning Appraisals and Organizational Realities. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Mount, M.K. (1984). Psychometric properties of
subordinate ratings of managerial performance. 
Personnel Psychology. 37., 687-702.
Murphy, K.R., Balzer, W., Kellam, K., & Armstrong, J.G. 
(1983). Purpose of rating and accuracy in 
observing behavior and evaluating performance. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Anaheim, CA.
Ott, L., Larson, R.F., & Mendenhall, M. (1983).
Statistics: A tool for the Social Sciences (3 
ed.). Boston: Duxbury.
Pearce, J.L., & Porter, L.W. (1986). Employee
responses to formal appraisal feedback. Journal 
of Applied PsychologY, 71, 211-218.
126
Platz, S.J. (1985). Organizational characteristics 
affecting ratee perceptions of the appraisal 
process and ratee intentions to change.
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation: Louisiana
State University.
Podsakoff, P.M., & Farh, J.L. (1989). Effects of
feedback sign and credibility on goal setting and 
task performance. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes. 44. 45-67.
Roberson, M.T., & Sundstrom, E. (1990). Questionnaire 
design, return rates, and response favorableness 
in an employee attitude questionnaire. Journal of 
Applied Psychology. 75, 354-357.
Russell, J.S., & Goode, D.L. (1988). An analysis of 
managers' reactions to their own performance 
feedback. Journal of Applied Pschvlogy. 73,
63-67.
Smith, D.E. (1986). Training programs for performance 
appraisal: A review. Academy of Management
Review. 11, 22-40.
Stone, D.L., & Stone, E.F. (1985). The effects of
feedback consistency and feedback favorability on 
self-perceived task competence and perceived 
feedback accuracy. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes. 36. 167-185.
Sulsky, L.M., & Balzer, W.K. (1988). Meaning and
measurement of performance rating accuracy: Some
methodological and theoretical concerns. Journal 
of Applied Psychology. 73. 497-506.
Tziner, A., & Latham, G.P. (1989). The effects of
appraisal instrument, feedback and goal-setting on 
worker satisfaction and commitment. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior. 10, 145-153.
127
Williams, K.J., DeNisi, A.S., Blencoe, A.G., &
Cafferty, T.P. (1985). The role of appraisal 
purpose in information acquisition and 
utilization. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes. 35. 314-339.
Williams, L.J., Cote, J.A., Buckley, M.R. (1989) Lack 
of method variance in self-reported affect and 
perceptions at work: Reality or artifact?
Journal of Applied Psychology. 74, 3, 462-468.
Zedeck, S., & Cascio, W.F., (1982). Performance
appraisal decisions as a function of rater 
training and purpose of appraisal. Journal of 









I am conducting research relevant to the Ph.D. degree in 
Industrial/Organizational Psychology at Louisiana State University. I 
am conducting this research to learn more about how certain 
organisational conditions surrounding performance appraisal would 
affect your opinions concerning its use. Due to the fact that I 
cannot create the actual conditions 1 wish to research in on 
organizational setting, I need your help, t have written a 
description of a hypothetical performance appraisal and the 
organizational conditions surrounding it. I would like for you to 
assume that you received this appraisal given the described 
conditions. Please read the description carefully, and respond to 
the attached questionnaire os you would if you had actually received 
the rating in the situation described.
After completing the survey, please place the entire packet in 
the stamped pre-addressed envelope provided. Your participation in 
this study is completely voluntary.
Your responses to all guestlons are completely confidential.
None of the completed questionnaires will be seen by anyone except the 
researchers here at Louisiana State University. Please do_not sign 
your name to your questionnaire. Sign only the consent form at the 
bottom. Additionally, the results of this study will be reported so 
that no individual person can be identified.
Your interest and cooperation ore greatly appreciated. Your 
responses will contribute significantly to the success of this 
research. If you have any questions about tills research entitled 
"Performance Appraisal Questionnaire", feel free to contact me through 
the Department of Psychology, Louslann State University, Baton Rouge, 
LA 70803 or phone (501) 388-0745 (o) or (504) 767-7651 (h). Thank 
you once again I
Louisiana State University requires that all subjects are told that 
their participation is voluntary, and that they sign a consent form.
PLEASE READ AMD SIGH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT*
I have read the above statements regarding my participation in this 




Ifred C. Schnur, Jr., M.A.
SIGNED* DATE*
Appendix B 




rlosse assume that you are employed by an organization In the 
same position that you currently hold. Please alao assume that In 
this orgsnl ration you fccelvp an annual written par f ormance review 
which Is sent to the Personnel Department. this review Is used by 
the Tersonnel Department to determine yout salary Increase/decrease 
lot the upcoming year. The wtltten performance review is the major 
variable used In determining employee compensation.
The performance review la conducted by your Immediate 
supervisor during your annual performance review meeting. During 
this meeting, your supervisor presents your written performance 
review (which will he sent to the personnel department) and gives 
you verbal feedback regarding your performance. The performance 
review has several rating categories, however the one which Is most 
Important duo to Its Impact on salary Is the OVERAl.t, PERFORHABCB 
RATIHO, which Is rated on the following scales
1 2 3 4 3 3 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Oood Outstanding
Average Average
On the following page la a description of "your" performance 
review. Along with thle description Is a brief dlscuealon of the 
conditions In the organization that may have had an effect on your 
performance rating. Please assume that you received this rating 
given the organizational environment described. In addition, your 
objective performance level (e.g., your "true performance") la 
indicated.
Following this description, you will be ashed to give your 
reactions to the review and answer severs) other questions. Please 
remember that your responses will be confidential and seen by no one 
other than the researchers here at hSU. Thank you again for your 
time and cooperation.
Appendix C
Vignettes Describing Organizational Conditions
I
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01: I n f l a t e d ,  o t l i e t n  d e f l a t e d ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in “your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review wlilcli Is completed hy your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to t.lie Personnel Department. 
Mtlmngh the evaluation form that Is used hy "your” or gnn I rnt I on has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike! the nvESAl.t, 
t'EBFOnMABCR nATIRO. Overall performance Is rated on n 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 - 1  5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Oood Outstanding
Average Average
This rating Is used to determine the nmount of pay Increase 
that yon will receive and In determining promotion. Thin Is of 
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. tinting this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel dcpnttment, Indicated that your overall
performance wan "Outstanding" (7). Your supervisor also verbally
Indicated that your overall performance wan "Above Average" (5).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realise that your organisation Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that yon 
received "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review. In
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and 
get a maximum merit Increase for you. Additionally, yon are aware 
that other employees In your department were rated lower than




Performance Review Indicated! "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated! "Above Averngo" (5);
Objectively, Your Performance was! "Above Average" (5)I 
Your Co-Horkers*
Performance was rated! l.owor than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  yo u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  o n  t h e
f o 1 l o w l n g  p a g e .
# 2 !  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  d e f l a t e d ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In "your* organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed l>y your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Pepartmnnt. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used hy "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workern, and the organlrat I on alike: the OVEHW.Ii
PERFORHAnOR rat I (Id. Overall porfotmnncn Is rated on a 7 roint 
scale ranging from ’Unacceptable’ (I) to “Outstanding” (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 d  5 6  7
Unacceptable Poor fielow Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rntlng Is uand to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. Thin In of 
major Importance to you, duo to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Jnat como from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. (luring this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, Indicated that your overall 
performance wan “Above Average" f *?), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated that your overall performance was “Outstanding” 
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Below Average" (3).
Von realise that, your organisation Is highly politlcnl and 
people tend to protect tliel r own Interests. You suspect that you 
received “Above Avernqo" (5) on yntir written performance review, 
In part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you 
and get a mart 1 mum merit Increase tor you. Additionally, you ate 
aware that other employees in your department were rated lower 




Performance Review indicatedr "Above Avetngo" (I!)}
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated! "Outstanding" f7) y 
Objectively, Your Performance west "Below Average" (3)»
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rsted! bower than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
43 ;  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  d e f l a t e d ,  no d i s c r e p a n c y
As rrevlonsly mentioned. In ’•your" organ!ration you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed hy your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used hy "your" orgnnlrptlon hn9 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organtr.atlon alike! t.lie ovERAl.f, 
rEnFORMARCE RAT1RG. Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Toor llelow Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rntlng Is used t.n determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. Thin Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rntlng 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review. Ibis review, which wns sent 
to the .personnel department, Indlcnted that your overall 
performance wns "Outstanding" (7). Your supervisor also verbally 
indicated that your overall performance was "Outstanding" (7). 
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
Yon realise that your organisation Is highly pollttcnl end 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect tlist you 
tecelved "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review, In
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and 
got a maximum merit Increase for you. Additionally, you are nware 
that other employees in your deportment were rnted lower thon




Performance Review Indicated; "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated; "Outstanding" <7);
Objectively, Your Performance was; "Abovo Averngo" (5)j 
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated'; I.ownr than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind t h e  r n t l n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t l o n n s l r e  w h ic h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
I 4 t  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  I n f l a t e d ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your" organization you annually 
receive » written performance review which 1» completed hy your 
Immediate supervisor mid forwarded to tlio Personnel Department. 
Alttiougli the evaluation form thnt is used hy "your" organization has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance lo 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike! the o v e b a m , 
rERFOBMAnCE nATinG, Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from ’Unacceptable" (1) to "outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 1 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rntlng la used to dotermlnc the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. Tills Is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rntlng 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
Ton have just come from your annunl performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel. department. Indicated thnt your overoll 
performance was "Outstanding" (7), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indlcnted that your overall performance was "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Above Average” 
(5).
You realise that your organisation In highly political and 
people tend to protect their own Interests. Yon suspect that you 
received "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review. In 
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and 
get a maximum merit incrense for you. Additionally, yon ate aware 
that other employees In your department were rated higher than 
their actual performance, due to their supervisors wishing to avoid 




Performance Review Indicated! "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Above Average" (5)f
Objectively, Your Performance was: “Above Average" (5) t
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  yo u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  g u e s t l o n n a l r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
*5 !  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  i n f l a t e d ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
An previously mentioned, in “your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review wlilcli in completed hy your 
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Fcrsonnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that In used by “your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Irt of mont Importance to 
you, your co-workcra, and the organisation alike; the OVEnAM. 
PERFOnHAnCR RATWG. Overall performance In rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rntlng In used to determine the amount of psy Incrense 
that you will receive atul In determining promotion. This Is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional ratlnq 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary incrense.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which wan sent 
to the personnel department, Indlcnted that your overall 
performance wan “Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indlcnted that your overall performance wns "Outstanding" 
<7). Objectively, your performance wan "Helow Average" (3).
you realise thnt your organisation In highly political and 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you 
received "Above Average” (5) on your written performance review. 
In port, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you 
and get a maximum merit Increase for you. Addltionnl ly, you are 
aware thnt other employees In your department were rated higher 




Performance Review Indlcnted; "Above Average" (5)j 
Verbal Feedback
ftom your Supervisor indicated; "Outstanding* <7)>
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Relow Average" (3);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rnted: Higher than tholr actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind t h e  r n t l n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c l r c u m s t n n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e n t i o n n n ! r e  w h i ch  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
I d  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  I n f l a t e d ,  no  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, In "your” organ!ration you annually 
receive a written performance review which to completed hy your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Pepnrtment. 
Although the evaluation form that la used hy "your'' organization lias 
several points of evaluation, one rating la of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike! the OVERAI.I, 
FERFORMABCE RATtSO. Overall performance la rnted on a 7 point 
acale ranging from "Unacceptable" (I) to “Outntnndlng" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rntlng Is lined to determine the amount of ray Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. This Is of 
major Importance to you, dun to the fact that each additional rntlng 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Incrense.
Vou have just come from your annunl performance review meeting 
with your supervisor, Burlng this meeting, your supervisor showed 
yon your written performance review. This review, which wns sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance wns "Outstanding" (7). Your supervisor also verbally 
Indicated thnt your overall performance was "Outstandlhg" (7). 
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realize thnt your organization Is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you 
received "Outstanding" ( 1 ) on your written performance review. In 
port, because your supervisor wished to nvold conflict with you and 
get a maximum merit Increase for you. Additionally, you are aware 
that other employees In your department were rnted higher than 




Performance Review Indicated! "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indlcnted! "Outstanding" <7|j 
Objectively, Your Performance was! "Above Avorngo" (5jj 
tour Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r n t l n g  yo n  r o c e l v p d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
139
f  7:  I n f  l u t e d ,  o t h e r s  s c c u r a t o ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, In "your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your 
Immediate supervisor and fotwardnd to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form thnt In used hy "your" organisation tins 
several points of evaluation, one rntlng 1n of most Importance to 
you, your co-workern, nnd the organisation alike: the overai.i,
rEBFORHAUCE BATIno. Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point 
scole ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Oood Outstanding
Average Average
Tills rating In used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion. This Is of 
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rntlng 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Just come from your annual petformsnce review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which wns sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated thnt your overall 
performance wns "Outstanding" (7), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indlcnted that your ovetnil performance wns "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Above Average 
<5>.
You realise thnt ymtr organisation Is highly political nnd 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you 
received "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review. In 
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and 
get s maximum merit Increase for you. Additionally, you are swnre 
that other employees In your deportment were given ratings equal 
to their actual performance.
' Eunmftxr 
Sour Written
Performance Review Indicated: "Outntnndlng" (7)f
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated: “Above Avornge" (5)»
Objectively, Your Performance wss: "Above Average" <B);
Your Co-Workers’
Performance was rated: Equal to their actunl performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h ic h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
IB:  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your” organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel bepartment. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your” organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike! the OVERAI.f. 
PERFORMANCE RATlflG. Overall performance Is rated on n 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below,
1 Z 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Relow Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. This Is of 
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
you have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. boring this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance wan "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated that your overall performance wns "Outstanding" 
<7). Objectively, your performance was "below Average" (3).
Ton realise that your organisation In highly political and 
people tend to protect, their own Interests. Yon suspect that you 
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review, 
In part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you 
and get a maalmum merit increase for yon. Additionally , you are 
aware that other employees in your department were given ratings 
egual to their actual performance.
' Ciumisjut 
Sour Written
Performance Review Indicated: "Above Average" (5)f
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated: "Ontntandlng" (7)j
Objectively, Your Performance wss: "Relow Average" (3);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Equal to tholr actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  o n  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 9 :  I n f l a t e d ,  o t h e r a  a c c u r a t e ,  no  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In “your" otgnnlrntlon you annually 
receive a written performance review wlijcli Is completed hy your 
Immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to Hie retsonnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation lins 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the orqnnl r.nt Ion nllke: the OVERM.l,
PER FORMANCR RATJRrt. Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranqlnq from “Unacceptable" (1) to "outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating In uned to determine the amount of pay increase 
thst you will receive nnd In determining promotion. This Is of 
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to tlie personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Outstanding" (7). Your supervisor also verbally 
indicated that your overall performance was "outstanding" (7). 
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" <5).
You realise that yont organisation Is highly political nnd 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you 
received “Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review, in 
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and 
get a maximum merit Inctease for you. Additionally, you are aware 
that other employees in your department were given ratings equal 
to their actual performance.
Suromajuc 
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated! "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated: "Outstanding* (7)j
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Above Avorsgo" (5)1
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Equal to tholr actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you r e c e i v e d  nnd t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h ic h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 1 0 !  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  d e f l a t e d ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
An previously mentioned. In "your" organisation you onnnally 
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your 
Immediate aupetvlnor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organization has 
several points of evaluation, one rating In of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike! the OVERAI.I. 
rERFORMAflCR RATIRC. Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 #  5 € 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating In nsed to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion. This Is of 
major importance to yon, dun to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hove Just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was “Above Average" (5). however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated tliot your overall performance was "Below 
Average" (3). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
Yon realize that your organization Is highly political and 
people tend to protect tlinlr own Interests. You suspect that yon 
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review. 
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because 
sn "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit 
Increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
sre aware that other employees In your department were rnted lower 




Performance Review Indicated! 'Above Averngo" (5)t 
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated: "Below Averngo" (3);
Objectively, Your Performance was: 'Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: T.owor than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
f i l l  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r *  d e f l a t e d ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
An previously mentioned. In "your” organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to I: Ire Personnel Deportment. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by “your" orqanlration has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike; the OVERAT.f. 
FERFORMAWCR RATJBO. Overall performance 13 rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Relow Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion. This Is of 
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
Ton have Just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which wns sent 
to the . personnel department. Indicated tlint your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5>, however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated that your overall performance was “Outstanding" 
(7). Objectively, your performance wns "Outstanding" (7).
You realise that your organisation Is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You nnspect that yon 
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review, 
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because 
on "outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit 
Increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees In your department were rated lower 




Performance Review Indicated! "Above Average" (5)|
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated! "Outstanding" (7)j 
Objectively, Your Performance was! "Outstanding" (7J;
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated! l.ower than their Actual performance.
K e e p i n g  I n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  nnd t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on  t t ie
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
1 1 Jt  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  d e f l a t e d ,  no d i s c r e p a n c y
An previously mentioned. In "your" organ!nation you annually 
receive a written performance review which in completed by your 
Immediate supervlnor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that In used l>y "your” organisation tins 
several polntn of evaluation, one rating In of mont Importance to 
you, your co-wotkorn, and the organisation a I Ikes the OVERAM, 
rERFORHAflCB RATIHG. Overall performance in rnted on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outntnndlng" (7). Hie 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
Thin rating In uned to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. This In of 
major importance t.o you, due to the fact that each additional tntlng 
point corresponds to n significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your nnnunl performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, Indicated that your overall 
perfotmnncn was "Above Average" (5). Your supervisor also 
verbally Indlcntod that your overall performance wns "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
Yon realise that your organisation Is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you 
received "Above Average" <5) on your written performance review, 
In pnrt, because your supervisor wished to motlvnte you, and because 
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a qrenter merit 
Increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees In your department were rated lower 




Performance Review indicated! "Above Average" ( S ) t  
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated! "Above Average" (5)j 
Objectively, Your Performance wasi "Outntandlng" (7)>
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated! bower than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind t h e  r a t i n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
( 1 3 :  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  I n f l a t e d ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In “your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the rersonnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your"' organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike: the OVERAM,
FERFORHAHCB RATJHO. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Relow Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating Is used to determine the amount of pny Increase 
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion. This Is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have Just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During thin meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally indicated that y nir overall performance wns "Below 
Average" (3). Objectively, ycur performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your «rganlzablon Is highly political nnd 
people tend to protect their o..’n Interests. You suspect that you 
received "Above Averngo" (5) ou your written performance review, 
In part, because your supervisor fished to motivate you, nnd because 
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit 
increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees u your department were rated 
higher than their actual performance In order to minimize conflict 
and supervisors' personal feelings for the employees.
Summary 
Your Written
Performance Review indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Below Avarage* (3)>
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Outstanding" <7);
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind t h e  r a t i n g  y o u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
1114: Deflated, othera Inflated, negative discrepancy
t
As previously mentioned, In "your" organ!ration you annually 
receive n written performance review which Is completed by your 
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike: the OVEBM.t,
PEP FORHANCE RATING. Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable” (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
Thla rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. This Is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, Indlcnted that your overall 
performance wns "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally indlcnted that your overall performance wns "Outstanding" 
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political nnd
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review, 
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because 
an “Outstanding” (7) rating would hnve led to a greater merit 
Increase which would hnve strained his budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees In your department were rated 
higher than their actual performance In order to minimize conflict 
and supervisors' personal feelings for the employees.
B.unsnarY 
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated: “Above Average" (5)»
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: 'Outstanding* (7);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In mind t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  nnd t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
* 1 5 ;  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r a  I n f l a t e d ,  n o  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In "your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by “your" organization has 
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike; the OVERAM. 
PERFORMANCE RATING. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Avernge
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive and in determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
Vou have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, indicated that your overall
performance was "Above Average" (5). Your supervisor also 
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Above 
Avernge" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests. You suspect that you 
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review, 
in part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because 
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would hnve led to a greater merit 
increase which would have strained liis budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees in your department were rated
higher than their actual performance in order to minimize conflict 
and supervisors' personal feelings for the employees.
Summary
Your Written
Performance Review indicated: "Above Average” 15);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: “Above Average" (5);
Objectively, Your Performance was: “Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  y o u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
*1 6 !  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In "your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
Immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike: the OVERAM.
PERFORMAHCE RATIflG. Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. This Is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated that your overall performance wns "Below 
Average" (3). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realise that your organization is highly political nnd 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you 
received "Above Average” (5) on your written performance review. 
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because 
sn "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit 
Increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees In your department received ratings 
equal to their actual performance.
Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated: "Below Average" (3);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Equal to their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind t h e  r a t i n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
#17 :  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As prevlouoly mentioned. In "your” organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike: the OVERAM.
PERFORMAHCE RATING. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Avernge
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive and in determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hnve just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
yon your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated that your overall performance wns "Outstanding" 
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests. You suspect that you 
received "Above Avernge" (5) on your written performance review. 
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, nnd because 
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would hnve led to a greater merit 
Increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
are aware that other employees in your department received ratings 
egual to their actual performance.
Summary
. Your Written 
Performance Review indicated: "Above Average" <5);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Outstanding* (7);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers’
Performance was rated: Egual to their actual performance.
Ke ep in g  Jn mind t h e  r a t i n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  g u e s t i o n n a l r e  w h i ch  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
#1 8 !  D e f l a t e d ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  no  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your” organization you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed hy your 
immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organization has 
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike: the OVERAL1.
PERFORMANCE RATING. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive and in determining promotion. This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During thin meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel deportment, indlcnted that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5). Your supervisor also 
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect thnt you
received "Above Averngo" (5) on your written performance review, 
in part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because 
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit 
increase which would have strained his budget. Additionally, you 
ere aware that other employees In your department received ratings 
equal to their actual performance.
Summary
, Your Written 
Performance Review indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Equal to their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 1 9 :  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  d e f l a t e d ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your" orqnnixntlon you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
immediate supervisor a.nd forwarded to the Tersonnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the orgnnlratIon alike; tiie OVERAM, 
PERFORMAHCE RATJHG. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranqing from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and in determining promotion. Tills is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional toting 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hnve just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, indicated that your overall 
performance was "Outstanding" (7), however, your supervisor 
verbally Indicated that your overal 1 performance was "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance wns "Outstanding" (7).
You realise that your organisation is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests. You suspect that your 
supervisor told you that you were "Above Average" (5), in part, to 
motivate you to perform even better in the future. Your written 
performance review wns accurate so that you wnuld get a maximum 
merit Increase. Additionally, you are aware that other employees 
in your department were rated lower than their actual performance, 
so that they would receive minimum merit increases thus responding 
to organisational pressures to minimise merit increases.
Eiunmajut 
Your Written
Performance Review indicated: "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Objectively, Your Performance was: “Outstanding" (7);
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Lower than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  y o u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 2 0 :  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r o  d e f l a t e d ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In "your" organization you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed hy your 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organization has 
several points of evaluation, one rating in of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike! the OVERAM, 
PERFORMAHCR RATIHG. Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point 
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
Tills rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. Thin is of 
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the- personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally tndtcnted that your overall performance was "Outstanding" 
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realize that your organization Is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests. You suspect that your 
supervisor told you that you were "Outstanding" (7), in part, to 
motivate you and because ho wished to avoid conflict with you. 
Additionally, you are aware that other employees in your 
department wore rated lower than their actual performance, so that 
they would receive minimum merit Increases thus responding to 
organizational pressures to minimize merit Increases.
Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated: "Above Average" (5):
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Outstanding" (7):
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Above Average" (5);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: bower than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In mind t h e  r a t i n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 2 1 :  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  d e f l a t e d ,  no  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your” organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your” organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike: the OVERALL
PERFORMANCE RATING. Overall performance is rnted on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive and in determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
Vou have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, indicated that your overall 
performance wns "Good" (6). Your supervisor vorbnlly indicated 
that your overall performance m b s  "Good" (6 ).  Objectively, your 
performance was "Good" (6).
You realize that your organization is highly political and 
people tend to protect tholr own interests, however you received an 
accurate rating. Additionally, you are aware that other employees 
in your department were rated lower than their actual performance so 
that they would receive minimum merit increases, thus responding to 
organizational pressures to minimize merit increases.
Bunmajuf
Your Written
Performance Review indicated: "Good" (6);
'Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Good" (6);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Good" (6);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Lower than their actual performance.
Keeping In mind the rating you received and the circumstances
surrounding, please complete the questionnaire which begins on the
following page.
922s A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  I n f l a t e d ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In "your" organization you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed hy yotir 
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organization has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike: the OVERAM,
PERFORMAHCE RATING. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding” (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive snd In determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was Sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Outstanding" (7), however, your supervisor 
vorbally indicated that your overall performance was "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that your 
supervisor told you that you were "Above Average" (5), in part, to 
motivate yon to perform even better In the future. Your written 
performance review was accurate so that you would get a marlmum 
merit Increase. Additionally, you are aware that other employees 
in your department were rnted higher thnn their actual performance. 
You Btispect this was so these employees would receive maximum merit 
Increases thereby avoiding conflict and confrontation.
SlUPTOAJUE 
Your Written
Performance Review indicated: "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Outstanding" (7)j
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind t h e  r a t i n g  you r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h ic h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
II23'. A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  i n f l a t e d ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
Aa previously mentioned, in "yotir" organization you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the retsonnel Department. 
Although the evaluation Form that is used by “your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating in of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike: the OVERAM,
PERFORMANCE RATJHG. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
Thin rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive nnd in determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your, written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, Indlcnted that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Outstanding" 
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realise that your organisation is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests. You suspect that your 
supervisor told you that you were "Outstanding" (7) In order to 
motivate you, and to avoid conflict with you. Additionally, you are 
aware that other employees in your department were rated higher 
than their actual performance. You suspect this was so these 




Performance Review Indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated! "Outstanding" (7)j 
Objectively, Your Performance was! "Above Average" (5);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  yo u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 2 4 :  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  I n f l a t e d ,  no d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In “your” organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which la completed by your 
Immediate supervlnor and forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike: the OVERAl.l.
PERFORMANCE RATINO. Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Relow Average Above Cood Outstanding
Average Average
This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive nnd in determining promotion. This Is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hove just come from your annunl performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the • personnel department, Indlcnted that your overall 
performance was "Good" (6). Your supervisor also verbally 
indicated that your overall performance was "Good" (6). 
Objectively, your performance was "Good" (6).
You realise that your organisation is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests, however your received an 
accurate rating. Additionally, yon ate aware that other employees 
in your department were rnted higher than their actual performance. 
You suspect this was so these employees would receive maximum merit 
increases thereby avoiding conflict and confrontation.
Summary
Your Written
Performance Review indicated: "Good" (G)j
• Verbal Feedback 
from your Supervisor indicated: "Good" (G);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Good" (G)j
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Higher than their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e B s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h ic h  b e g i n s  o n  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 2 5 :  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  p o s i t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned. In "your" organization you annually 
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your 
Immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike: the OVERAM.
PERFORMANCE RATING. Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point 
scale rnnqlng from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Relow Average Above Good Outstanding
Avernge Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and In determining promotion. This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact thnt each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You hove just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your wrltton performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the . personnel department, Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Outstanding" (7), however, your supervisor 
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Above 
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that your 
supervisor told you that you were "Above Average" (5), in part, to 
motivate you to perform even better In the future. Your written 
performance review wns accurate so that you would qet a maximum
merit increase. Additionally, you are aware that other employees 




Performance Review indicated: "Outstanding" (7);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Above Average" (5);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "outstanding" (7>;
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated: Equal to their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  In  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  y o u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 2 6 :  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  n e g a t i v e  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your“ organization you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed by your 
immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your” orqnnlnation has 
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, nnd the organization alike! the OVERAM, 
PERFORMAHCE RATJHG. Overall performance is rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Below Average Above Good Outstanding
Average Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase 
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the foct that each additional rating 
point corresponds to o significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. nuring this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department, Indlcnted that your overall 
performance was "Above Average" (5), however, your supervisor 
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Outstanding" 
(7). Objectively, your performance wns "Above Avernge" (5).
You realize that your organization is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests. You suspect that your 
supervisor told you that your were "Outstanding" (7) to motivate 
you and to avoid conflict with you. Additionally, yon are aware 




Performance Review Indicated! "Above Average" (5);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Outstanding" <7);
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Above Average" (5);
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Equal to their actunl performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mi nd  t h e  r a t i n g  y o u  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e .
# 2 7 !  A c c u r a t e ,  o t h e r s  a c c u r a t e ,  no  d i s c r e p a n c y
As previously mentioned, in "your" organisation you annually 
receive a written performance review which is completed hy your 
immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department. 
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has 
several roints of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to 
you, your co-workers, and the organ! zatlon alike: the , OVERAI.T,
FBRFORHARCE RATING. Overall performance 13 rated on a 7 point 
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7). The 
scale appears below,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unacceptable Poor Relow Average Above Good Outstanding
Avernge Average
This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase 
that you will receive and in determining promotion. This is of 
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating 
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting 
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed 
you your written performance review. This review, which was sent 
to the personnel department. Indicated that your overall 
performance was "Good" (6), Your supervisor also verbally 
indicated that your overall performance was "Good" (6). 
Objectively, your performance was "Good" (6).
You realise that your organization is highly political and 
people tend to protect their own interests, however, you received an 
accurate rating. Additionally, you are aware that other employees 




Performance Review indicated: "Good" (6);
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated: "Good" (6) t
Objectively, Your Performance was: "Good" (6):
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated: Equal to their actual performance.
K e e p i n g  i n  mind  t h e  r a t i n g  you  r e c e i v e d  and t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g ,  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w h i c h  b e g i n s  on t h e






Please respond to the following statements based on the 
feedback you received and the other Information In the preceding 
description. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with 
each of the following statements. Please use the following 
scale in responding to each statement.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Neither Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Agree nor Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Please write the number corresponding to your extent of
agreement in the Elanic to the left of each statement.
Acceptance of Rating
  1. I am satisfied that this appraisal accurately
reflects my performance.
  2. 1 accept this appraisal as accurate.
  3. This appraisal Is biased and does not reflect my
true performance.
  4. Based on my performance, I was accurately evaluated.
Trust in Organization
  5. I find it difficult to believe that this
organization looks out for its employees.
   6. I trust this organization to act in my best
interest.
  7. It appears that this organization tries to be honest
in dealing with its employees.
  0. In general, this organization can be trusted.
Trust in Appraisal Process
  9. I believe that the appraisal process in this
organization leads to appropriate promotions.
  10. This performance appraisal process is ethical in
dealing with employees.
 ___  11. I feel that the performance appraisal process In
this organization yields appropriate results.
  12. The performance appraisal process In this
organization can be trusted.
  13, I believe that the performance appraisal gyatem in
thie organization generally yields appropriate 
apraisals.
Trust in Supervisor
  14. The supervisor who gave me this rating wns honest
and ethical in dealing with me.
  15. The supervisor who gave me this rating allowed
personal biases or motives to Influence my 
appraisal.
  16. I feel confident that the supervisor who gave me
this rating will always try to treat me fairly.
  17. I trust the supervisor who gave me this rating.
Desire to Respond to Feedback
  18. This appraisal motivates me to perform my job more
< effectively.
  19. ThlB appraisal will help me-to set goals to improve
my performance.
  20. This appraisal makes me not want to expend any extra
effort In performing my job.
  21. The appraisal X received makes me feel like working
harder at my job.
Value of Appraisal System
  22. The performance appraisal system in this
organization is a worthwhile endeavor.
  23. The performance appraisal system In this
organization helps employees perform more 
effectively.
  24. The performance appraisal system in this
organization is primarily an inconvenience to 
supervisors and subordinates alike.
  25. The performance appraisal system in this
organization is of great value to all employees.
Manipulation checks
  26. My written performance rating in thin exercise was
inflated (e.g., it indlcnted that my performance was 
better than it actually was).
  27. My written performance rating in this exercise was
deflated (e.g., it indicated that my performance was 
worse than It actually was).
  28. My written performance rating In this exercise was
accurate (e.g., it reflected my actual performance).
  29. My written appraisal was more positive than verbal
feedback from my supervisor.
  30. Hy written appraisal was more negative than verbal
feedback from my supervisor.
  31. My written appraisal was the same as verbal feedback
from my supervisor.
Demographics
32. My age is _____  years.
33 My sex is (circle one) male female
34. 1 have been employed at my present job for _____
years.






Dear P a r t i c i p a n t ,
I am conducting research relevant to the Ph.D. degree In 
Industrial/Organizational Psychology at Louisiana State University.
I am conducting this research to learn more nbout organizational 
conditions' surrounding performance appraisal and your opinions 
concerning Its use. This research la Intended to n3d to our knowledge 
of how appraisal affects you. Because this Is the ease, the results 
should allow us to make suggestions on how to best conduct performance 
appraisal In organizations to maximize Its benefit to employees and 
management alike.
For thin research to be successful, I need your help. Please 
consider all that yon know about I) the way ynur own performance In 
evaluated, 2) the way that the performance oE other employees Is 
evaluated, and 31 the way Jn which performance appralsnl Is handled In 
your organization. With this In mind, please complete the survey 
which follows on the next page. After completing the survey, please 
place the entire packet In the stamped pre-nddressed envelope 
provided.
Your participation In this study Is completely voluntary. Your 
responses to all questions are completely confidential. None of the 
completed questionnaires will be seen"by anyone except the researchers 
here at Louisiana State University. rlonse do not sign your name to 
your questionnaire. Sign only the consent form at the bottom. 
Additionally, the results of this study will be reported so that no 
Individual person can be Identified.
Your Interest and cooperation are greatly appreciated. Your 
responses will contribute slgnlElcantly to the success of this 
re-search. il you have any questions about this research entitled 
"Performance Appraisal Survey”, feel free to contact me through the 
Department oE Psychology, Louslana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 
70003 or phone (504) 380-0745 (o) or (504) 767-7651 (hi. Thank you 
once agalnl
Sincerely,
Alfred C. Schnur, Jr., M.A.
Louisiana State University requires that all subjects are told that 
their participation Is voluntary, and that they sign a consent form. 
PLEASE READ AIID SIGH TIIE FOLLOWING STATEMENT I
I have read the above statements regarding my participation In thin 




Deacripiton of Political use of Performance Appraisal
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I am Interested in your opinions regarding performance appraisal 
in your organization. It has been suggested that performance 
ratings in organizations are sometimes distorted
(Inflated/deflated) for political reasons. Political distortion 
of ratings Is defined as "ratings which are inflated or deflated 
so as not to accurately reflect employee performance for 
political reasons”. Some political reasons for distortions are 
listed belowt
»* Supervisors wish to avoid conflict with subordinates.
** Supervisors wish to increase employee motivation.
• * Supervisors fond of subordinates.
» • Supervisors wish to Increase employee pay raises.
*» Supervisors 
look good.
wish to make themselves or their departments
• * Supervisors 
employees.
wish to create documentation for firing
• » Supervisors respond to organizational pressures to
minimize pay raises by deflating appraisals.
In the following survey, please use the preceding definition of 






S t u d y  2
•1
To better understand performance appraisal i would like you to 
complete the following survey. Based on your own experience In 
your organisation, please Indicate the extent to which you agrge 
with each of the following statements. Please use the following 












Please write the number corresponding to your extent of
agreement in the Blank to the left of each statement.
Inflation of Ratings
  1. Due to organizational politics, my performance
appraisal Is sometimes higher than my performance 
warrants.
  2. Politics in my organization causes my performance
appraisals to sometimes Indicate that I am 
performing at a higher level than I actually 
am (e.g., Inflated ratings).
  3. Hy performance appraisals are sometimes more
positive than is warranted by my actual performance 
because of organizational politics.
  4. In certain cases, due to organizational politics,
I receive higher performance ratings than my actual 
performance indicates.
Deflation of Ratings
  5. Due to organizational politics, my performance
ratings are sometimes lower than I deserve.
  6. Hy performance ratings are sometimes deflated due to
organizational politics (ratings lower than my 
actual performance).
  7. Hy performance appraisals are sometimes more
negative because of organizational politics than is 
warranted by my actual performance.
  B, Organizational politics sometimes causes my
performance appraisals to be more negative than is 
Indicated by my actual performance.
Perception of Politico in the Appraisal Process
  9. Performance appraisal in my organization is
influenced by politics to a great extent.
  10. Performance appraisals in my organization ore
usually free from political distortions.
  11. Supervisors in my organization use employee
performance appraisal as a tool to nchieve political 
goals.
  12. Biased performance appraisals due to politics are
rare in my organization.
Perceptions of Equity in Appraisal
  13. Hy performance is evaluated as fairly as the
performance of my co-workers.
  14. Other employees receive higher performance ratings
than they deserve.
  15. I receive performance ratings equivalent to others
performing as well as myself.
  16. My supervisor evaluates me using the same standards
as he/she does with other employees.
Correspondence Between Written and Bpoken Appraisal
If you do not receive verbal feedback from your supervisor in a
a formal/informal performance appraisal interview, please skip
questions 17 through 20.
  17. Verbal feedback in my appraisal Interview
corresponds to my written performance evaluation.
18. Due to organizational politics, my written 
performance evaluation is sometimes more positive or 
negative than verbal feedback from my supervisor 
during the appraisal interview.
19. In my appraisal interview, due to organizational 
politics, verbal feedback from my supervisor is 
sometimes less positive or negative than my written 
performance evaluation.
20. Due to organlzationol politics, my written 
performance evaluation sometimes differs from verbal 
feedback I receive from my supervisor in my 
appraisal interview.
Acceptance of Hating
  21 .  I  u s u a l l y  a c c e p t  my p e r f o r m a n c e  r a t i n g s  a s  a c c u r a t e .
  22. I am satisfied that my most recent appraisal was
accurate.
  23. In general, my appraisals are biased and do not
reflect my true performance.
  24. Based on what I contribute to my organization, I am
accurately appraised.
  25. I understand why I was evaluated an t was on my last
appraisal.
Trust in Organization
  26. Often, I find it difficult to believe that my
organization looks out for its employees.
  27. I trust my organization to act in my best interest.
  ,28. Host of the time, my organization tries to be honest
in dealing with its employees.
  29. In general, my organization can be trusted.
Trust in Appraisal Process
  30. I trust that the appraisal process in my
organization can be trusted to handle promotions 
honestly.
  31. The performance appraisal system can be trusted to
use consistent standards in evaluating employees
  32. The performance appraisal system In my organization
can be trusted.
  33. I believe that the performance appraisal system in
my organization can be trusted to produce 
appropriate ratings.
Trust in Supervisor
  34. Hy supervisor can be trusted.
  35. At times, my supervisor allows personal motives or
biases to influence his/her decisions.
  36. I feel confident that my supervisor will always try
to act in my best interest.
  3 7 .  I  t r u s t  my s u p e r v i s o r .
Desire to Respond to Feedback
  38, Hy performance appraisal makes me feel motivated to
perform effectively.
  39. I use my performance appraisal to set goals to
improve my performance.
  10. Hy performance appraisals usually do not make me
wish to expend any extra effort in performing my 
job.
  41. My performance appraisals usually motivate me to
perform my job.
Value of Appraisal System
  42. The performance appraisal system In my organization
is a worthwhile use of resources.
  43. The performance appraisal system In my organization
helps employees with day-to-day relations with 
supervisors.
  44. The performance appraisal system In my organization
is primarily an inconvenience to supervisors and
subordinates alike.
  45. The performance appraisal system In my organization
helps employees with recognizing their strengths and
improving on their weaknesses.
Demographics
46. Hy age is years.
47. Hy sex is (circle one) male female
48. 1 have 
years.
been employed at my present job for
49. I have been employed full-time for years,
Vita
The author, Al C. Schnur, Jr., was born in East 
Lansing, Michigan in 1964. He attended Kansas State 
University where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree 
in Psychology in 1986. He received a fellowship to 
attend Louisiana State University where he received 
his Master's degree in Industrial Organizational 
Psychology in 1988. Mr. Schnur will receive his Ph.D. 
from that institution in 1992. He has given several 
presentations at organizational sciences conventions 
and has published several articles in this area. Mr. 
Schnur has completed two internships in the human 
resources field. Currently, he is employed by 
Psychological Consultants to Industry in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania as a consulting psychologist.
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